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Few generalizations can be made without elaborate 
qualification about the Victorian world, its writers, and 
their productions. Victoria's was a long reign (1837-1901) 
marked by many events and words, England became in the 
second half of the century the greatest industrial power in 
the world. The flag of the commonwealth circled the earth.
To the external observer at least, England seemed immune to 
the revolutions which swept the Continent from 1789 until 
the mid-nineteenth century. After I87O London became the 
economic center of Europe, replacing Paris in international 
banking.1 At home there was unparalleled economic prosperity, 
and for the first time In the nation's history there were 
signs that England's prosperity could be the people's pros­
perity. Democracy was the word, and, however limited its 
practice may have been, the economic and social principles 
of modem democracy were established in Victoria's reign. 
Popular education was increased vastly in the nineteenth cen­
tury, and, although it was I918 before school fees were abol­
ished in all elementary schools,2 the expanded reading public 
had a clear effect on the publishing industry in general and 
on journalism in particular. Penny dailies— the Daily
1
2
Telegraph, the Standard, the Dally News, and the Dally 
Chronicle— were by the 1870's relatively large publication 
newspapers directed, as was the Times, toward middle and 
upper classes. But In the eighties and nineties with 
Tlt-Blts, the Evening News. and the Dally Mall the half­
penny press emerged, directed specifically toward the newly 
educated masses, providing a sensationalism previously un­
known In Journalism.5
The International power, domestic prosperity. Increas­
ing franchise, and new literacy were not, however, lauded by 
all members of the society. For a few the utilitarian spirit 
which made possible England's International role as well as 
her domestic economy thrived at the expense of traditional 
moral and cultural values. The new democratic spirit with 
Its Implicit end, elevation of the masses to self-determin­
ation and ultimately to determination of the directions of 
society Itself, was frightening. It was frightening because 
there was no recent historical precedent which could Illus­
trate possible virtues of such change; on the contrary, the 
Idea of popular rule was shadowed by the anarchy and tyranny 
which followed the French Revolution of the previous century. 
At home the many attempts throughout England to organize 
trade unions, frequently resulting In violent confrontation 
between owner and worker, worker and law, seemed a microcosm 
of that anarchy and tyranny. The new literacy, too, as It
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began to influence advertising and through advertising 
publishing appeared to some to be leveling the entire soci­
ety to the lowest common point rather than raising the masses 
to higher intellectual, moral, and cultural levels. The 
newspaper by the end of the century became for many, as for 
Arthur Symons, "the plague, the black death, of the modern 
w o r l d . T h e  writings of the greatest intellectuals of the 
age reveal a fear that the old and new worlds cannot coexist, 
and that without the values of the old the new will have no 
human reason to exist.
The major prose writers of the last two-thirds of the 
nineteenth century reflect an anxiety which developed out of 
their inability to accept utilitarianism as the central 
motive and method of all individual and collective activity. 
These individuals respond in widely differing ways, but they 
do agree that steam power and the newspaper do not constitute 
the millennium. Newman's acceptance of traditional dogma 
in his spiritual life and plea for a return to education of 
the whole man; Carlyle's call for a hero, a Victorian David 
to slay the Goliath popular democracy; Matthew Arnold's 
assertion that survival of culture itself depended upon the 
individual's ability to dissociate himself from the enthu­
siasms of the age; Pater's central message that "Everything 
that has occupied man, for any length of time, is worthy of 
our study"5— each response is to a world incomplete and un-
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acceptable to the analytical mind. Ruskin, too, responds 
and it is upon his writing that this study centers.
Few would question that John Ruskin was a significant, 
if not a central, figure in the Victorian world. B o m  in 
the same year as Victoria,^ survived by his queen by lust 
one year, Ruskin's life spans the long reign. For almost 
half of the century, from 1844 until about 1890,7 he produced 
the volumes which reflect the sensitivity and rage of a mind 
too intensely aware of the objects and lives surrounding 
it to remain silent. The sheer mass of Ruskin's prose is 
over whelming. The text of the Library Edition of his works 
includes thirty-seven volumes, totaling over sixteen thou­
sand pages, exclusive of appendices.® This in itself is not 
extremely unusual for Victorian writers; Newman, Carlyle, 
Matthew Arnold, and Pater all produced considerable bodies 
of prose. The variety of subject material with which Ruskin 
dealt, however, is unusual. Painting, architecture, liter­
ature, biology, geology, economics, and a host of other topics 
are approached with an air of authority in his writings. To 
many specialists in the fields in which Ruskin assumed 
authority, he was an unlearned, frustratingly dogmatic man 
too wealthy to be defeated by his own ignorance, but for 
thousands of others in the last third of the nineteenth 
century he was a modern-day prophet, a voice from the storm 
cloud itself. Like his most remembered contemporaries, he
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had a double vision, looking directly on the world around 
him, yet never losing sight of worlds that had been and 
could be. The diversity of his prose is testimony to this. 
Perhaps it is by this Janus-face that Ruskin is most dis­
tinctly recognizable as a Victorian.9
Whatever similarities Ruskin may have had with other 
major Victorian writers, it is a curious fact that he stood 
essentially alone both in his personal life and in his pro­
fessional associations. The physical isolation of his child­
hood has been told too often by biographers and too well by 
Ruskin himself to deserve treatment here,10 but of his 
adult relations some comment is necessary. With the exception 
of Carlyle Ruskin had close contact with none of the great 
Victorians, and with Carlyle a master-disciple relationship 
is implicit. Vftien Ruskin did attempt to assume himself 
Carlyle's peer, a breach in their friendship occurred which 
was only tentatively reconciled in the elder's lifetime.H 
Ruskin had a multitude of acquaintances in England, on the 
Continent, and in America; the body of his correspondence is 
large, numbering in the thousands of letters, but there is 
no Tennyson-Hallam, no A m o  Id-Clough relationship in his 
life. His friends, if such a term may be used, can be clas­
sified in two groups: those who intensely admired Ruskin and
those whom Ruskin intensely admired. His university exper­
ience serves as one example of his isolation from the true
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intellectual peers of his generation. During his period 
at Oxford, enrolled in Christ Church college, Ruskin seems 
to have been unaware of the intellectual frenzy of Balliol 
in those same years.. As Derrick Leon has noted, "Between 
1831 and 1841, indeed, Balliol produced all the most bril­
liant men, which included, in the single decade, two arch­
bishops of Canterbury, two Lords Chief Justice, two cabinet 
ministers, two poets (Clough and Arnold) and many famous 
scholars. But with such men as Clough, Matthew Arnold,
Stanley and Jowett, all his contemporaries, Ruskin made no 
acquaintance.
It is not difficult to understand why, in the absence 
if intimate intellectual relationships, Ruskin's writings 
take the highly individual directions that they do.13 There 
can be little question that he writes of painting, architec­
ture, clouds, and butterflies out of personal and private 
interest rather than because these topics were of particular 
concern to the society in which he lived. As might be 
expected, the prose style and method of argument which Ruskin 
developed are highly individual, reflective of an unsystem­
atic mind, a mind not structured by the patterns of formal 
education. Ruskin read widely in the poetry and prose fiction 
of the nineteenth century and his writings illustrate a 
familiarity as well with earlier English literature. There 
are many comments about and allusions to literature in
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Ruskin's works, but, they are seldom organized in a manner 
which suggests a conscious critical intent. Most frequently, 
his statements about literature and his quotations from 
poetry and prose are used to illustrate non-llterary topics 
such as painting; architecture, and economics. While there 
are isolated passages in his writings which are clearly lit­
erary and suggest critical intent, the student who seriously 
wishes to study Ruskin's response to literature must read 
a great many of his works clearly of a non-literary nature.
The purpose of this study is to consider Ruskin's 
response to prose fiction, to the novel, particularly in 
relation to the general aesthetic principles he developed at 
some length during the first twenty years of his writing 
career. He had a continuous contact with the novel from very 
early childhood until late in his life. He writes in the 
opening passages of his incomplete autobiography Praeterita 
of his early reading: "I had Walter Scott's novels and the
Iliad for constant reading when I was a child, on week-days: 
on Sunday, their effect was tempered by Robinson Crusoe and 
the Pilgrim's Progress. . . ."^5 Late in 1887, less than 
three years before mental depression ended all activity, 
he listed a number of novels he had read recently in letters 
to a friend and to a novelist he wished to praise for the 
moral qualities of her work.^^ There are many comments on 
and allusions to novels— they number in the hundreds--in
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Ruskin's works, but only a few are clearly organized literary 
criticism. On the whole the many references to prose fiction 
are reflective of the unsystematic structure of the majority 
of his works. To come to a full understanding of Ruskin's 
response to prose fiction, however, it is necessary to con­
sider both passages of organized literary criticism and the 
many isolated allusions. Anything less would be to enforce 
an arbitrary formalism upon his works.
Literary scholarship and criticism have almost totally 
ignored this aspect of Ruskin's work. Of the several hun­
dred Ruskin studies, books and articles, now in print, only 
two distinctly relate to the topic. Of these two, one, 
"Ruskin and George Eliot's Realism, does not center on 
Ruskin at all but discusses the influence of Ruskin's the­
ories on Eliot's fiction. The second, "Ruskin and the 
Waverley Novels,"18 is more to the point. It is a fairly 
complete survey of Ruskin's attitudes toward Walter Scott 
and toward the Waverley novels. The author is concerned pri­
marily with collecting data from the vast body of Ruskin's 
work, and very little space is given to analytical discus­
sion of that material. With the exception of isolated men­
tion in other studies of Ruskin's attitude toward one or 
another of the many novelists he read, these two articles 
constitute the total scholarship related to the topic.
There are numerous studies of Ruskin's relationships with
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Tolstoy and Proust, but to consider these would be to shift 
attention from Ruskin's response to fiction to the response 
of Proust and Tolstoy to Ruskin and his Ideas. The need 
for a thorough study of this aspect of Ruskin's literary 
criticism Is clear. By the mld=nlneteenth century the novel 
was a major literary form. David Masson In his study British 
Novelists and Their Styles finds that between 1820 and I856 
some three thousand novels In about seven thousand volumes 
were added to the British Museum Library.19 By I856 Ruskin 
was the most productive of Victorian writers on art and 
aesthetics. To understand his response to the novel brings 
the student of Victorian literature a step closer to under­
standing the age Itself.
It Is curious that so little attention has been given 
to this particular material when, In fact, rather thorough 
treatment has been accorded to other aspects of Ruskin's 
work. Generally Ruskin studies may be grouped In three 
somewhat overlapping areas: biographical, aesthetic, and
social. Of biographical work little can be said of relevance 
to the topic of this study. The primary biography of Ruskin 
Is by E. T. Cook, published In 1911.^0 This two-volume 
work Is still basic to Ruskin studies, although numerous 
others have appeared since Its publication. Recent biogra­
phies have differed In two basic ways from the Cook work: 
through careful study of letters aspects of Ruskin's personal
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experience have been discovered which were unknown In the 
early twentieth century, and with the rise of popular Inter­
est In psychology, the events of his life have been rein­
t e r p r e t e d . One study deserves special note. Ruskin*s 
Scottish Heritage; A Prelude by Helen Gill Vlljcen Is a
first volume of a projected definitive biography of Ruskin.22 
The thorough nature of this volume certainly suggests that 
If Professor Vlljoen Is consistent her work will be far 
superior to those which have proceeded It.
Less attention has been given to study of Ruskin*s 
aesthetics than to biographical Issues, but there are sev­
eral excellent studies which deserve note. Henry Ladd's 
The Victorian Morality of Art traces the sources of Ruskin*s 
aesthetic principles, considers how he used those sources, 
and reviews the contradictions as well as the unanswered 
questions Implicit In his writings.23 There have been a 
number of more specialized shorter studies, but Ladd's 1932 
work Is still the most valuable single study of the general 
topic.24 Also there are numerous studies concerned with 
the specific application of aesthetic theory In the fields 
of painting, architecture, and, to a lesser degree, poetry. 
The primary contribution of such studies Is clarification of 
the body of Ruskin*s applied aesthetics, much of which 
seems contradictory and Inconsistent. Among the most Infor­
mative of such studies related generally to literary matters
11
are Charles T. Dougherty's "Ruskin's Moral Argument," J. D.
Thomas's "Poetic Truth and Pathetic Fallacy," and especially
Bertram Morris's "Ruskin on the Pathetic Fallacy, or on How
a Moral Theory of Art May Fail."^^ In addition there are
several unpublished doctoral dissertations which consider
3'csciiic topics of literary relevance; none, nowever, are
related to Ruskin's criticism of prose fiction.
The great body of writing about Ruskin concerns his
work after i860, his social and economic involvement.
Ruskin's image as a prophet for the age developed not from
his first volumes, but from the lectures and essays on
social questions which dominate his later publications.
His popularity with and influence upon the Victorian world
emerged primarily from the four essays of Unto This Last
and the volumes that followed rather than from Modem Painters
27and The Stones of Venice. The large circulation of the 
early volumes, frequently in the form of selections, came 
after 1870, when the author's primary attention had ceased 
to be on man's relationship with nature and art. The great 
mass of Victorian society was clearly more concerned with 
changes in social and economic structure than with questions 
of art and aesthetics, and it is understandable that the 
reputation of Ruskin should emerge from his later work. It 
is equally understandable that the twentieth century, with 
its interest in those same issues, snould also give primary
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consideration to the later xork, and it would appear that 
despite new approaches to Ruskin's aesthetic writings,^® 
his statements on society will continue to claim the central 
attention of the contemporary reader.
The attention of the present study, as has been noted, 
is directed toward prose fiction and Ruskin's response to 
it. In order to consider his various statements as more 
than individually isolated comments, it is helpful to review 
the aesthetic principles he developed in his first nine 
v o l u m e s . I t  is in these volumes that he concentrated 
most clearly on questions of nature, the creative imagina­
tion, the artistic product itself and how man relates himself 
to each. Without becoming involved in the questionable 
assumption that all of Ruskin's comments are consciously 
derived from the early principles, it can be noted that 
the central aspects of his aesthetic are implicit in much 
of his literary comment and allusion. A survey of the 
aesthetic principles with their apparent inconsistencies 
can clarify the foundation upon which the structure of his 
literary comment stands. That structure has its inconsist­
encies also, but despite the somewhat disorganized appearance 
of much of his later writing, Ruskin's judgments are firmly 
established within the central aesthetic which dominates 
all of his work.
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of the newer variety, like Northrop Frye, or like W. S.
Yeats in his criticism," perhaps as the first "archetypal" 
critic (p. xvi).
nine volumes and their publication dates are as 
follows: Modern Painters, I (1345); (1846); III, IV
(1856); V (1360; The Seven"Lamos of Architecture (18?91:
The Stones of Venice, I (Ï851); II, H I  (1853T T
CHAPTER II 
RUSKIN'3 AESTHETICS
Rene Welleck in his A History of Modern Criticism 
asserts that "Ruskin's aesthetics apply to literature, for 
he always refused to draw a line between painter and poet. 
Rather obviously this statement is fundamental to any study 
of the theoretical basis of Ruskin's literary criticism.
'/fiien he praises Walter Scott's excellence in describing 
external nature, it is only reasonable to look to the lengthy 
discussions of the principles underlying J. M. W. Turner's 
excellence as a landscape painter. From these discussions 
the reader may discover what importance Ruskin placed on 
landscape, hov: it relates to man, and how man is to repre­
sent it in art. The volumes concerning architecture simi­
larly state an aesthetic which Is relevant to understanding 
the bases of judgments of literature. Statements such as 
V/elleek's must, of course, be qualified by simple reason­
ableness, since much of Ruskin's application of theory to 
specific asoects of painting and architecture has no relation­
ship, and consequently no relevance, to literature. The 
central justification for such an approach to Ruskin's 
aesthetic principles and their application is realized by 
recognizing the thesis that ultimately unifies all of his 
writing. Throughout his works— whether centered on painting,
16
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architecture, literature, or social problems man, his
spiritual integrity and harmony, is of central concern.
He asks why man responds as he does to nature and to rep­
resentations of nature, what determines the patterns of his 
physical constructions, and why he must recognize the power 
of social and economic structures around him; each of these 
Questions centers upon the life and well-being of man.
Thus, for Ruskin the aesthetics of painting, architecture, 
and literature may have their particularities, but they 
radiate from and relate back to one consistent center.
Discussion of Ruskin's aesthetics demands, perhaps 
to a greater degree than with any other major writer,^ 
summary of even the central volumes. While much of his work 
has rather general application, in the mid-twentieth century 
it is read only by specialists. The advanced student of 
Victorian literature expects to read Newman's Apologia Pro 
Vita Sue and The Scone and Nature of University Education, 
Arnold's Culture and Anarchy, and Carlyle's Sartor Resartus 
and Of Heroes and Hero Worship, but of Ruskin's works, only 
selections. Modern Painters and The Stones of Venice are 
among the "icest known titles in Victorian literature, but 
few have read the eight volumes which comprise the two 
works. Therefore, in order to discuss with any clarity the 
relationship between Ruskin's criticismof- the novel and 
his aesthetics, it is essential that the major ideas of
18
those early volumes be surveyed. Only those passages which 
are central to his aesthetics or relate in a specific way 
to prose fiction need he summarized; other more special­
ized material relating particularly to painting or architec­
ture need not be cons idered.
The first volume of Modern Painters, published in 
1843 when Ruskin was twenty-four years old, began seven years 
earlier as a brief defense of J. M. W. Turner. Turner's 
painting "Juliet and Her Nurse" had been attacked by Blackwood's 
Magazine for historical inaccuracies and false representa­
tion of nature.3 The brief essay, which was sent only to 
the owner of the painting, is barely recognizable as the 
germ of the eventual five-volume work, the large majority of 
which seems to be only vaguely related to Turner. The first 
volume opens with the assertion that art which has been long 
admired must be good because erroneous opinion, however 
widely held, is inconsistent and will eventually fade in 
the light of just opinion. Great amounts of time may be 
necessary before the superior prevails over the inferior, 
but Ruskin argues that gradual victory of "all that is highest 
in art and literature" is certain.^ This process, however, 
does not relate to judgment of mP.dern art, the work of 
Turner and his contemporaries, Ruskin's declared subject.
Turning to the viewer, he introduces a topic to be dealt 
with many times throughout his writings, the condition of
19
mind which permits valid Judgment of contemporary art. 
Viewers, Ruskin argues, misjudge because they assess the new 
against the old rather than the new and old against their 
actual subjects. Re-education must take place; men must be 
taught to see clearly and accurately the world around them 
so that they can rise above custom and tradition in their 
Judgments.5
Ruskin's task, then, is to provide that re-education. 
Regarding painting as the "language" of art, he develops 
a direct parallel between painter and poet; paint and method 
are to the painter what words and language are to the poet. 
Painting, like literature, conveys ideas, and Ruskin asserts 
in his earliest definition of greatness in art "that the 
art is greatest which conveys to the mind of the spectator, 
by any means whatsoever, the greatest number of the greatest 
ideas. . . It follows directly th-at the greatest artist
is one who "has embodied, in the sum of his works, the great­
est number of the greatest ideas."? Ruskin argues that 
there are five kinds of ideas that can be received from works 
of art— ideas of power, imitation, truth, beauty, and rela­
tion. Ideas of power are those which arise in the viewer 
from "simple perception of the mental or bodily powers 
exerted in the production of any work of art";8 they are 
divorced altogether from the actual nobility or worthiness 
of the art object. Only a trained eye through knowledge of
both the subject and the artist's response can properly 
Judge power, since aurearance of difficulty may be deceiv­
ing. "It is far more difficult to be simple than to be 
complicated," Ruskin notes.5 Ideas of imitation concern the 
pleasure received from the perception that something pro­
duced by art is not what it seems to be. For Ruskin they 
are the most contemptible that can be received from art; they 
relate only to low or mean subjects, since great or noble 
subjects cannot be imitated. Also, ideas of imitation center 
on deceit in impressing the viewer by catering to his expec­
tations rather than to truths of which he may be unaware.
It is upon truth that Ruskin centers this and much of 
his later aesthetic comment. Ideas of truth differ from 
those of imitation in their involvement with emotions, im­
pressions, and thoughts as well as with material represen­
tation. Truth may be presented through signs or symbols 
which do not image a likeness to a particular fact, and, un­
like ideas of imitation, they appeal both to the conceptive 
and to the perceptive faculties. Ultimately, truth and 
imitation are inconsistent. Truth, "the faithful statement, 
either to the mind or senses, of any fact of n a t u r e , c a n ­
not be compatible with that which derives its pleasure from 
deception, from falsehood. The greatest artist will recog­
nize that "the truths of nature are one eternal change—  
one infinite v a r i e t y , a n d  will choose and present the
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essential characteristics of his subjects, the highest 
truths. For Ruskln, "All really great pictures ^.e., 
truthful/, therefore, exhibit the general habits of nature, 
manifested in some peculiar, rare, and beautiful way.
The moral ethic of art which dominates Ruskin's statements 
on painting, architecture, and literature has its genesis 
in this concept of truth as the central "idea" which can be 
received from art.
Turning then to ideas of beauty and relation, Ruskin 
argues that those of beauty give pleasure through simple 
contemplation of "outward qualities without any direct and 
definite exertion of the intellect. Taste for Ruskin 
concerns the faculty of receiving pleasure from material 
sources which are attractive to the moral sense. One who 
does not receive pleasure from these sources has no taste, 
and one who receives pleasure from other sources has false 
taste. The observer's response to beauty is instantaneous 
and non-intellectual. Because the viewer's moral feelings 
and intellectual powers are inseparable, he will respond 
to "intellectual beauty," but he will not be able to explain 
that response. When he can say how and why he has responded, 
he has proceeded to ideas of relation, all of those ideas 
"conveyable by art, which are the subjects of distinct 
intellectual perception. . . . Ideas of beauty are the 
subjects of moral, non-intellectual perception; inve'stiga-
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tion of Intellectual perception leads to ideas of relation.
The remainder of the volume is given to discussion 
of the "truths" of nature which both artist and viewer must 
understand before the highest art can be created or be 
understood. With particular concern for painting he dis­
cusses color and chiaroscuro, then centers his discussion 
upon specifics of external nature— space, sky, clouds, 
mountains, water, and vegetation. From this lengthy comment, 
with many examples and comparisons, mainly from modern paint­
ing, Ruskin concludes that "Turner is the greatest landscape 
painter who has ever l i v e d . "^5 The young author reaffirms 
the necessity of an aware, experienced observer, but Modern 
Painters cannot give the requisite knowledge; it can only 
lead the reader to observe nature carefully, apart from 
the conventions of tradition.
There are problems in this first major volume. Ruskin’s 
ideas are not systematically developed in terms of his 
sources. As his editors have noted, "Ruskin's education 
was broken and discursive. Henry Ladd names Plato, 
Aristotle, the Bible, Locke, Hogarth, Burke, and Reynolds 
as sources to some degree for the ideas of Modem Painters 
I, but he finds Ruskin unread in the works of Hume, 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and other major eighteenth-century 
thinkers.17 For Ladd it is a "confounding background" that 
leads to "confusing but earnest p a r a g r a p h s . Also, in
25
this volume Ruskin does not clearly distinguish between 
artist and observer, a problem considerably more serious in 
his attempts to structure a theory of the imagination in 
the second volume. Rene Welleck argues that the central 
weakness of that work is that it "suffers from a lack of 
clarity in distinguishing between viewer and artist, between 
man in general and the artist, and between the artist's mind 
and the finished work."19 But despite problems, Ruskin 
established in Modern Painters 1 an important base for his 
later aesthetic writings. However influenced he may have 
been by eighteenth-century theories of art, Ruskin's advocacy 
of diversitarlanism identifies him as heir to the "Romanti­
cisms" of Wordsworth and Coleridge, a position particularly 
evident in his discussion of the imagination in Modern 
Painters II. Also, the attention given to the viewer, 
stressing the false conditioning which keeps him from seeing 
clearly the world in which he lives and thus from judging 
accurately the works of those who do see clearly, suggests 
the emphasis on the harmony and unity of the total man 
central to much of his later writing, both in artistic and 
social areas. This emphasis establishes the humanist prin­
ciple, essentially Christian, dominant in his thought.20
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Modern Painters 
I in terms of literary criticism is the multitude of ref­
erences throughout to writers and their works, particularly
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21to poets and poetry. George Herbert, Milton, Scott, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats are all 
quoted in the volume, primarily for the purpose of illus­
trating the aesthetic ideas discussed. In his attempt, for 
example, to clarify the directions English landscape paint­
ing should take, Ruskin turns to lines from Wordsworth:
So fair, so sweet, withal so sensitive;—
Would that the little flowers were born to live 
Conscious of half the pleasure which they give.
That to this mountain daisy's self were known 
The beauty of its star-shaped shadow, thrown 
On the smooth surface of this naked stone.
and asserts that "Our painters must come to this before they 
have done their d u t y . " 2 2  The five ideas which can be re­
ceived from art are stated always in terms applicable to 
any object of art as are other of the aesthetic principles 
of the volume. It is in no way surprising that Wordsworth, 
Tennyson, Mrs. Gàskell, Charlotte Bronte, the Brownings, 
and George Eliot were attracted to Modem Painters before 
any had a personal acquaintance with R u s k i n . ^3
The second volume appeared three years later and, 
like its predecessor, is concerned with definition and clar­
ification of aesthetic principles. Ruskin makes clear in 
the opening pages that art is a serious matter which makes 
great demands on both artist and viewer:
Art, properly:,so called, is no recreation; it cannot 
be learned at spare moments, nor pursued when we have 
nothing better to do. It is no handiwork for drawing­
room tables, no relief of the ennui of boudoirs; it
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must be understood and taken seriously, or not at all.
To advance it men’s lives must be given, and to re­
ceive it, their hearts.24
He also clarifies his oivn role, extending his task beyond
the original defense of Turner and revealing an intensity
of purpose more akin to his later social writings than to
his first volume:
. . . the object I propose to myself is of no partial 
nor accidental importance. It is not now to distinguish 
between disputed degrees of ability in Individuals, or 
agreeablenesE in canvases; it is not now to expose the 
ignorance or defend the principles of party or person; 
it is to summon the moral energies of the nation to a 
forgotten duty, to display the use, force, and function 
of a great body of neglected sympathies and desires, 
and to elevate to its healthy and beneficial operation 
that art which, being altogether addressed to them, rises 
or falls with their variableness of vigor. . .
This concern for the "neglected" conditions of mind which
determine how man sees and what he sees, stated in a moral
context, defines the tendency which becomes increasingly
dominant in later volumes. As Morton Berman has noted, in
Modern Painters II "Ruskin had already begun to move from
esthetic to social matters.
Primarily the volume is a discussion of the two fac­
ulties of mind which make possible the viewer's response 
to ideas of beauty and relation, two of the five ideas which, 
according to the first volume, can be received from art.
The first of these faculties is the Theoretic, the oper­
ation of which Ruskin terms Theoria.^'^ The Theoretic fac­
ulty is that which defines all right response to beauty as
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moral, reflective of the nobility of both object and viewer.
The "exulting, reverent, and grateful perception of it
£beaut^ I call Theoria,"^® Ruskin asserts in an attempt
to distinguish between moral impressions of beauty and
"Aesthetic" or sensual impressions. Aesthesis, as opposed
to Theoria, relates only to the "mere animal consciousness"
of pleasantness, inferior in that it is divorced from the
"sense of contemplation" essential to complete response to
the sublime in art.29 Ruskin argues that, although a viewer
may respond to the sensual, he can reorient himself to the
moral perception, Theoria, by recognizing that:
. . . over immediate impressions and immediate pref­
erences we have no power, but over ultimate impressions, 
and especially ultimate preferences, we have; and that, 
though we can neither at once choose whether we shall 
see an object red, green, or blue, nor determine to like 
the red better than the blue, or the blue better than 
the red, yet we can, if we choose, make ourselves ulti­
mately susceptible of such impressions in other degrees, 
and capable of pleasure in them in different measure.
And seeing that wherever cower of any kind is given there 
is responsibility attached, it is the duty of men to 
prefer certain impressions of sense to others, because 
they have the power of doing so.30
Ultimately, then, Theoria is a morally imperative condition
in which the spiritual harmony and unity of man is reflected.
Continuing his discussion of the Theoretic faculty as 
it enables man to respond to ideas of beauty, Ruskin dis­
tinguishes between "Typical" beauty and "Vital" beauty. He 
defines Typical beauty as the external quality of objects 
which, "whether it occur in a stone, flower, beast, or in
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man . . . may be shown to be in some sort typical of the 
Divine attributes. . . The "Divine attributes" he
notes, with illustration from painting and poetry as well 
as from nature, are infinity, unity, repose, symmetry, purity, 
and moderation. There are grades of Typical beauty; all 
objects are not equally beautiful, and it is in the highest 
or most noble degree of the manifestation of Typical beauty 
that man’s energies are called to the pursuit of it and he 
attempts to recreate it for h i m s e l f , their highest 
the external qualities of Typical beauty approach the inter­
nal sense of Vital beauty. Ruskin defines V ital beauty as 
"the appearance of felicitous fulfillment of function in 
living things, more especially of the joyful and right 
exertion of perfect life in m a n , a  definition clearly 
reflective of a moral orientation. Later in the volume he 
elaborates on the "vital" aspects of beauty:
Throughout the whole of the organic creation every 
being in a perfect state exhibits certain appearances 
or evidences of happiness; and is in its nature, its 
desires, its modes of nourishment, habitation, and death, 
illustrative of certain moral dispositions or principles. 
Now, first, in the keenness of the sympathy which we 
feel in the happiness, real or apparent, of all organic 
beings, and which . . . invariably prompts us, from the 
joy we have in it, ^  look upon those as most lovely 
which.are most happy ; and, secondly, in the justness of 
the moral sense which rightly reads the lesson they are 
all intended to teach, and classes them in orders of 
worthiness and beauty according to the rank and nature 
of that lesson; . . .  in our right accepting and reading 
of all this, consists, I say, the ultimately perfect 
condition of that noble Theoretic faculty, whose place 
in the system of our nature I have already partly vin­
dicated with respect to typical, but which can only
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fully be established with respect to vital beauty.5^
In this statement is the justification of a moral view of 
all experience, including art, which at once carries Ruskin 
into the ambiguous and finally mystic aress of "happiness" 
and divorces his morality from the strict Christian funda­
mentalism so often implied by his vocabulary. If his view 
here Involves contradictory ideas as one scholar argues,35 
it is also an impressionistic structure which permits Ruskin 
to approach literature, architecture, and society in a moral 
context related to the central terms happiness and fulfillment.
The second of the faculties of mind discussed in Modern 
Painters II is the Imaginative, which makes possible man's 
response to ideas of relation to the same degree that the 
theoretic faculty makes possible response to ideas of beauty. 
Ruskin distinguishes the imaginative faculty as that which 
"the mind exercises ih. a certain mode of regarding or com­
bining the ideas it has received from external nature, and 
the operations of which become in their turn objects of 
the theoretic faculty to other m i n d s . I n  a rather sweep­
ing rejection of all attempts to define the imagination in 
philosophic terms, Ruskin asserts that the imaginative fac­
ulty is "utterly mysterious and inexplicable, and to be 
recognized in its results only, or in the negative results 
of its a b s e n c e . "37 His discussion of that faculty is 
descriptive, centered, like much of his previous theory.
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in comment on specific caintings and poetry. Three functions 
of the imagination are noted, termed by Ruskin as associative, 
penetrative, and contemplative. In its associative function 
the imagination takes imperfect individual entities which, 
when joined with others, produce perfect total form. The 
process is not a conscious, controlled event, but is essen­
tially intuitive and thus, for Ruskin, inexplicable. The 
work of art produced by the associative function of the 
imagination is not, however, Coleridge's "diverse-coloured 
fruit":38 Ruskin Insists on organic unity as the ideal of 
this function and argu:es that if one object is removed from 
such a work the vitality of the entire unit is lost. Mere 
composition can be taken apart without undue harm; the 
creation of the imagination must be accepted as an organic, 
harmonious unit.39
The penetrative function of tne imagination ignores 
external appearances and moves directly to essential qual­
ities or truths. It is the "highest intellectual power of 
man," but Ruskin insists that, like the associative function, 
it exists without reason, without conscious intellectual 
c o n t r o l . H e  finds an absence of the penetrative imag­
ination in Milton, arguing that in Paradise Lost the poet 
depends upon descriptions of external violence rather than 
moving to the essence of the vision he wishes to express.
Of the description of Satan's fiery world in Book I, Ruskin
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comments, " . . .  we feel rather the form of the fire-waves 
than their fury."^^ In Aeschylus, Homer, Dante, and 
Shakespeare Ruskin finds this highest faculty to the degree 
that "every circumstance or sentence of their being, speak­
ing, or seeming, is seized by process from within."^2 As 
with the associative the penetrative aspect of the imagin­
ation assumes that the highest expressions of the mind in 
art will be organic.
The contemplative aspect of imagination Ruskin dis­
tinguishes from the previous two as a "certain habit or mode 
of operation" rather than as a distinct faculty of the imag­
i n a t i o n . T h i s  "habit" abstracts from the total impressions 
on the mind as perceived by the associative and penetrative 
faculties and "treats, or regards, both the simple Images 
and its own combinations in peculiar ways. Ruskin rec­
ognizes that memory of past experience and anticipation of 
beauty unseen are a part of all minds and will exert a great 
influence on the mind of the artist. 'While the expression 
is not used by Ruskin, the contemplative is rather clearly 
the idealizing function of the imaginâtion.^5 By means of 
the contemplative mode the imagination may reach truths 
unseen in the material structures of things, truths intu­
itively grasped. That power which does concern itself with 
material or external appearances Ruskin terms the fancy, 
and he consistently relegates it to a place inferior to the
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functions of imagination proper. He argues that the fancy 
has three functions complementary to the associative, 
penetrative and contemplative, but it never moves beyond 
appearances to moral truth.̂ 6 Within the frame of the imag­
inative contemplative Ruskin recognizes that art is not a 
direct transcript of nature but that sources of beauty 
"invariably receive the reflection of the mind under whose 
influence they have passed, and are modified or coloured 
by its image."4?
It is clear that by the conclusion of the second 
volume of Modern Painters Ruskin is concerned with the con­
ditions of mind which produce great art as well as those 
which enable the viewer to receive and assess impressions 
from art. He can argue from the principles established in 
these volumes that even "a few shapeless scratches" can move 
the imagination of the beholder, and that a work of a truly 
imaginative mind can sweep away the mind of the viewer.
It is e'vi’d ent that environment can influence the responses 
of either artist or viewer by distorting the way in which 
man sees, and, while Ruskin gives little space to the topic 
in these volumes, the foundation for later concentration 
on the influence of environment on architecture and on man 
himself is found here. It is, in fact, to architecture and 
the conditions under which great architecture may come into 
being that Ruskin directs his next four volumes. Only after
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an elaborate study of the environment and condition of mind 
■which produce man's most noble constructs does he return a 
decade later, In I856, to Modem Painters.
The Seven Lames of Architecture and the three-volume 
study The Stones of Venice extend the range of Ruskin's 
aesthetics by shifting emphasis from study of the nature of 
imagination to consideration of the social and moral milieu 
which permit the imagination to function. The shift is grad­
ual, beginning in Modern Painters II and not totally complete 
until publication In i860 in Cornhlll Magazine of the essays 
later collected as Unto This Last. The Seven Lamps of 
Architecture reflects Ruskin's awareness that the great con­
structs of Europe, primarily those of France and Italy, are 
In the process of decay and his urge to capture their passing 
magnificence In drawing and description; the volume centers, 
however, on an attempt to describe the aesthetic principles 
essential to great architecture and to Illustrate those 
principles In existing structures. Ruskin makes clear, as 
In the earlier volumes, the moral context within which his 
studies are founded, regardless of their particular appli­
cation:
It has been Just said, that there Is no branch of human 
work whose constant laws have not close analogy with 
those which govern every other mode of man's exertion. 
But, more than this, exactly as we reduce to greater 
simplicity and surety any one group of these practical 
laws, we shall find them passing the mere condition of 
connection or analogy, and becoming the actual expres­
sion of some ultimate nerve or fibre of the mighty laws 
which govern the moral world. . . . the truth, decision,
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and temperance, which we reverently regard as honour­
able conditions of the spiritual being, have a repre­
sentative or derivative influence over the works of the 
hand, the movements of the frame, and the action of theintellect.^9
The study of great architecture, then, can be one means of 
considering the moral conditions essential to greatness.
Seven principles or "lamps” are chosen to represent 
the sources of greatness in architecture— sacrifice, truth, 
power, beauty, life, memory, and obedience. Ruskin warns 
his reader, however, that "Both arrangement and nomenclature 
are those of convenience rather than of system ; the one is 
arbitrary, and the other Illogical; nor is it pretended that 
all, or even the greater number of, the principles neces­
sary to the well-being of the art, are included in the 
inquiry."50 Looking back on the volume in l88o while in 
the process of re-editing it, he also recognizes an unnec­
essary adherence to specifically religious connotations of 
morality and omits "some pieces of rabid and utterly false 
Protestantism."^^ As with Ruskin's earlier writings, the 
fundamentalist vocabulary which was his childhood legacy 
should not mislead the reader into association of his "mor­
ality" with the narrow dogmatism of his mother's evangel­
icalism. It would also be to misread the volume to see it 
as the exploitation of architecture for the purpose of dis­
cussing morality. It is, like the earlier works, a des­
criptive study centered upon more than two years of concern-
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trated study and recording, both by sketch and photograph, 
of specific facts of existing structures.
Three of the lamps of architecture--truth, power, and 
beauty— show a rather obvious similarity to truth, power, 
and beauty as "ideas" which can be received from art in the 
first volume of M odem Painters. The primary difference in 
Ruskin’s usage is in orientation; the seven lamps are those 
abstract moral qualities which relate builder or artist to 
the finished work, whereas the ideas of Modern Painters _! 
center upon the object-viewer relationship. The difference, 
however, is more semantic that aesthetic, reflected by the 
fact, previously noted, that Ruskin often fails to distin­
guish between artist and viewer in his early volumes. Truth 
is the dominant principle in all human activity, and Ruskin 
asserts that the spirit of truth, if strong "in the hearts 
of our artists and handicraftsmen," determines the dignity 
"of every art and act of man."52 Imaginative or fanciful 
vision is accepted in this volume as one aspect of truth 
"so long as it confesses its ideality." There must, Ruskin 
insists, be no deception; "It is necessary to our rank as 
spiritual creatures, that we should be able to invent and 
behold what is not; and to our rank as moral creatures, 
that we should know and confess at the same time that it is 
not."53 He argues that nature provides the architect with 
his only truly beautiful model, and it is this arg’ument
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which justifles his assertion that all beauty must be derived 
from natural forms. That which is powerful, however, de­
pends upon the ability of the mind to arrange and govern its 
concepts and materials. He concludes that "All building, 
therefore, shows man either as gathering /beauty? or govern­
ing /power/; and the secrets of his success are his knowing 
what to gather, and how to r u l e . "54 it is clear that Ruskin 
places Importance upon the architect's ability to control 
form In his structures as well as to reproduce beauty In 
the decorative aspects of his works.
Sacrifice and obedience, two of the remaining four 
lamps, are discussed almost solely In the language of 
Protestant fundamentalism, and, as a result, may appear 
somewhat limited as abstract aesthetic principles. Assum­
ing the position that man's work Is not needed by God, Ruskin 
calls for sacrifice motivated by adoration alone, totally 
unconcerned with any utilitarian end. Ruskin's plea to his 
own society Is for orie^ntation to attitudes rather than to 
objects; "It Is not the church we want, but the sacrifice; 
not the emotion of admiration, but the act of adoration; 
not the gift, but the giving."55 in abstract terms of 
orientation to values rather than to materialistic usefulness, 
Ruskin's call for sacrifice is closely related to his earlier 
comments on the Involvenent of artist and viewer necessary 
to all great art. But this volume places art Itself within
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a strictly religious context: "though it may not be nec­
essarily the interest of religion to admit the service of 
the arts, the arts will never flourish until they have been 
primarily devoted to that service. . . ."56 yig discussion 
of obedience has, likewise, religious connotations, al­
though it is less difficult to see the basic principles 
which are expressed in religious terminology. Asserting that 
all right effort recognizes that law and obedience, not free­
dom or license, determine man's proper attitude toward all 
of his activity, Ruskin moves beyond the basic concept that 
the service of God is perfect freedom,. He has only disdain 
for critics who call for stylistic freedom or originality 
in English architecture and the other arts. "A man who has 
the gift," he asserts, "will take up any style that is going, 
the style of his day, and will work in that, and be great 
in that, . . ."57 in its broadest context obedience is adher­
ence to established principles, whether recognition of gravity 
as natural law, structural patterns in architecture, or met­
rics in poetry. Law, not 31 berty, is central to Huskin's 
concept of life as well as art in this volume.
Of the remaining two lamps of architecture memory is 
treated rather briefly while life is developed as one of 
the major terms of the entire study. Ruskin asserts that 
architecture communicates the history of a nation to later 
generations more completely than other arts or the writings
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of the historian, an assertion which becomes a basic premise 
of his more elaborate study, The Stones of Venice. Memory 
has two duties with respect to architecture. It must preserve 
those objects which are man's inheritance from past ages, and 
it must create an historical architecture in the present 
which will communicate the spirit of the nation to future 
generations. But it is in his discussion of the lamp of life 
that Ruskin reveals the fundamental directions of his sub­
sequent thought. He argues that the work of art, however 
noble or ignoble, reflects the energy of the mind that created 
it. Noble art will not be produced by minds lacking in 
vitality or hands reduced to mechanical reproduction; by 
the same reasoning the careful observer or the art object 
can recognize the condition of the mind of the artist 
himself. Such observation is particularly relevant in 
architecture because inert stone does not distract the 
viewer from essential vitality in the same manner as color 
or phrase may in painting or literature. Turning, then, to 
the producing hand, Ruskin shifts emphasis from the work 
itself :
. . .  so long as men work ^  men, putting their heart 
into what they do, and doing their best, it matters not 
how bad workmen they may be, there will be that in the 
handling which is above all price: it will be plainly
seen that some places have been delighted in more than 
others . . . and the effect of the whole, as compared 
with the same design cut by a machine or a lifeless hand,
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will be like that of poetry well read and deeply felt to 
that of the same verses jangled by r o t e . 58
It is the concept stated here that makes possible the central
assertion of this section of the volume, one of the most
frequently quoted of Ruskin's statements;
I believe the right question to ask, respecting all 
ornament, is simply this: Was it done with enjoyment—
was the carver happy while he was about it? It may be 
the hardest work possible, and the harder because so 
much pleasure was taken in it; but it must have been 
happy too, or it will not be l i v i n g . 59
This principle that upon the happiness of the worker 
depends fulfillment in the work is not, in its full sense, a 
call to hedonism. Ruskin goes on to qualify his position 
within a religious context, arguing that man is "sent into 
this world" with specific tasks. When he is carrying out 
those tasks his work will be happy; when he is not, his 
efforts can only be mechanical and lifeless. It is a 
transition principle, oriented more to the workman than 
the discussion of the "vital" qualities of beauty in Modern 
Painters II but not yet centered directly upon the social 
circumstances which make noble creation possible, one topic 
of The Stones of Venice.
The first volume of The Stones of Venice appeared in 
1851, followed in 1853 by the second and third. Outlining 
the purposes of the volumes in the 1974 edition, Ruskin 
notes the first as an analysis of the best principles of 
structure in stone and brick, but he asserts, "The second and
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third volumes show how the rise and fall of the Venetian 
builder's art depended on the moral and immoral temper of the 
s t a t e , T h e  author centers his study on "The relation of 
the art of Venice to her moral temper," and "that of the 
life of the workman to his work," two issues he finds totally 
ignored in nineteenth-century studies of architecture.6l 
As with Ruskin’s earlier volumes, The Stones of Venice is 
founded upon careful observation. The volumes are intensely 
descriptive; abstract principles are consistently supported 
by reference to and, in many cases, plates illustrating 
specific examples of Venetian architecture. The entire 
first volume is a discussion of those structural laws which 
determine the physical limits of design. Upon this elaborate 
foundation the later volumes trace the major periods or 
evolving patterns of Venetian architecture to and from its 
Gothic pinnacle.
Ruskin's role as critic of architecture is the same 
as that which he assumed earlier in relation to painting.
His function is to re-educate architect, workman, and observ­
er: "it is necessary first to teach men to speak out, and
say what they like, truly; and, in the second place, to 
teach them which of their likings are ill-set, and which 
J u s t l y . "^2 Rec eg nizing that faults in an observer may cause 
a building to be discounted or the viewer’s enthusiasm cause
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faulty construction to be praised, Ruskin's urge is to give 
proper understanding as well as sympathetic temper. If he 
is successful in stating the vital principles that relate 
man to his creative effort, the "Stones of Venice" will be 
"touch-stones" to all understanding of such effort. As in 
his earlier thought all faulty judgment and excessive 
enthusiasm are signs of deviation from man's natural re­
sponses. Ruskin argues that "Half the evil in this world 
comes from people not knowing what they do like;. not 
deliberately setting themselves to find out what they really 
enjoy."^3 The entire discussion of natural response, how­
ever, rests on the concept of divine order and intent central 
to the "Lamp of Truth" in the previous volume. He calls upon 
his readers to accept "natural choice and liking" as "true 
humility, a trust that you have been so created as to enjoy 
what is fitting for you, and a willingness to be pleased, 
as it was intended you should be."64 His function in The 
Stones of Venice is nothing less than to guide man to a 
proper sense of himself and his efforts by the explicit 
premise that if.man is in his place, all will be right with 
the world. The remainder of Ruskin's career was spent 
reminding man that he was not in his place.^5
In this first volume of The Stones of Venice the 
author insists that to associate pleasure in art with rea­
sonableness and usefulness is to misunderstand the nature
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of man. Such association is futile and can only destroy
man's response to beauty. Ruskin attempts to outline a
proper "aesthetic" role:
You were made for enjoyment, and the world was filled 
with things which you will enjoy, unless you are too
proud to be pleased by them, or too grasping to care
for what you cannot turn to other account than mere 
delight. Remember that the most beautiful things in 
the world are the most useless; peacocks and lilies
for instance. . . .°°
His attempt, however, was easily misread by later generations, 
in the same manner that Walter Pater's "Conclusion" was to 
be misread two decades later, as a call for art for its 
own sake, art Justified by no system of values outside it­
self. Such a reading of this and other passages clearly de­
viates from the text of Ruskin's statement, since it ignores 
the intent or motive which he finds in every existing object 
and activity. The central issue is that Ruskin establishes 
a foundation for discussion of all art within the premise 
that noble art fulfills its natural or divine function and 
reflects an artist and society capable of Joy through ac­
ceptance of a universal chain of being. Ignoble or distorted 
art is a clear warning that man has refused to make that 
acceptance, primarily in the nineteenth century because of 
false association of the terms use and Joy.
As is to be expected, Ruskin finds all of external 
nature adequate as subject material for art, although in 
varying degrees.^7 His hierarchy of nobility of artistic 
subjects includes twelve levels, the highest being abstract
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lines from nature, crystal forms, and wave forms. The 
lowest or last of the order is man. For man to center hie 
architectural ornament upon himself is a sign of "miserable 
self-complacency, a contentment in our own wretched doings."^® 
Such art is limited, Ruskin argues, in that man does not 
derive greatest Joy from contemplation of his own image but 
from his sense of the divine in the world around him. Ruskin 
anticipates the possibility that his discussion of the sub­
ject material proper to noble art may be read as a call for 
photographic representation of nature itself. He meets this 
reading by asserting that the artist makes comprehensible a 
universe "unfathomable, inconceivable, in its whole" by long 
contemplation, then by careful presentation of "what he has 
learned of it" for his audience. He gathers that which he 
has learned from the infinity of nature and, in presenting 
that, at once reveals his own deepest thoughts and displays 
the object "in a thousand ways before unknown."^9
From these principles Ruskin turns to the architecture 
of Venice in its three major phases, Byzantine, Gothic, and 
Renaissance."^^ In the characteristics of Gothic architecture 
he finds reflected the proper relationship of man to nature 
and to his own creations. Observation tells Ruskin that 
those who designed, constructed, and decorated buildings 
during the Gothic period of Venice had clear sight and 
accepted with humility man's proper responsibilities in the
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universal order. His discussion of "The Nature of Gothic" 
is one of the most frequently published selections from his 
works and need not be extensively discussed here.^^ Ruskin 
finds six characteristic moral elements or conditions of 
mind reflected in the gothic structures of Venice: sav­
ageness, changefulness, naturalism, grotescueness, rigidity, 
and redundance. With more insistence than in his previous 
writings he argues that the end of art is not perfection 
and that the goal of life is not freedom. To demand per­
fection in a work of art is to demand that man become a 
machine, that he abandon his natural place in the creation. 
Thus Ruskin can attack all production which involves no act 
of individual creativity by the workman, whether it be imi­
tation, mass production, or exact finish for its own sake. 
Regarding the universe itself as in the process of decay, 
he concludes that imperfection must be a part of all art as 
it is "essential to all that we know of life."72 He briefly 
repeats the principle of The Seven Lames of Architecture that 
it is no slavery to obey, labor for, and revere another man, 
provided that that man accepts the responsibilities of lea­
dership and has himself the humility to serve. It is em­
phasis upon man's condition and that art which reflects 
the proper integration of man and society that dominates this 
and later aesthetic principles. By the 1850's art gains 
Ruskin's attention as an artifact which records man's
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condition for those who can see clearly. Art was never an 
end in itself for Ruskin, but by the mid-nineteenth century 
its aesthetic values are seldom mentioned; it is the life
art reflects that dominates his thought.
In his discussion of naturalism or love of nature 
Ruskin's aesthetics clearly center upon man. He argues 
that there are three classes of artists— purists, natural­
ists, and sensualists. By analogy to reapers he defines 
the three types : "The Purists take the fine flour, and the
Sensualists the chaff and straw, but the Naturalists take 
all home, and make their cake of the one, and their couch 
of the other." He continues and his point clearly is that 
only the Naturalist can produce great art:
That man /the Naturalist/ is greater . . . who contem­
plates with an equal mind the alternations of terror 
and of beauty; who, not rejoicing less beneath the sunny 
sky, can bear also to watch the bars of twilight nar­
rowing on the horizon; and, not less sensible to the
blessing of the peace of nature, can rejoice in the 
magnificence of the ordinances by which that peace is 
protected and secured.73
At their height of power those of Venice who created Gothic 
architecture were naturalists. In the third volume of 
Modern Painters Ruskin enlarges upon this basic classifi­
cation, extending it to specific discussion of music, paint­
ing, and literature. The greatest of poets, Homer, Dante, 
and Shakespeare are used to illustrate the "naturalist 
ideal."74 The naturalist's creations reflect the quality 
of mind termed the "imagination associative" in Modern
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Painters II. that imaginative power which creates from 
imperfect individual entities the unified and noble work 
of art. The central point of the discussion of naturalism, 
however, is to outline man's proper relationship to external 
creation, a relationship in which the artist "with all that 
lives, triumphing, falling, or suffering, . . . claims 
kindred. . . ."’̂5
Since Ruskin's confessed function in these volumes is 
educative, it is not surprising that he considers at some 
length the types of knowledge and education necessary to 
the artist. Early in the third volume of The Stones of 
Venice the general topic is introduced through a specific 
attempt to distinguish between art and science. Ruskin 
finds art centering upon appearances and impressions, science 
on facts and demonstrations. Both, he asserts, are concerned 
with truth, science with truth of aspect and art w.’ith truth 
of essence. He finds the realm of art much larger than 
that of science. Science studies the relations of things to 
each other, whiln art studies the relations of things to 
man and asks "what that thing is to the human eyes and 
human heart, what it has to say to m.ei, and what it can 
become to them."?^ Ruskin credits the decline of Venetian 
Gothic architecture into Renaissance forms to excessive 
concern with fact, essentially a shift to scientific orien­
tation. The artist must not value phenomena only insofar
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as they lead to facts.
The discussion moves directly to consideration of 
that education and knowledge proper to the artist. Denying 
any significant value to vicarious experience, Ruskln asserts 
that "The whole function of the artist in the world is to 
be a seeing and feeling creature. . . . His place is nei­
ther in the closet, nor on the bench, nor at the bar, nor 
in the l i b r a r y . I n t e n s i v e  concern with fact will only 
keep the artist from seeing and feeling. Knowledge does not 
in Itself open the artist's eyes; it may close them in reflec­
tion. Knowledge can have significant value only when the 
individual is capable of keeping it subordinate to his own 
work. For Ruskin, an educated man is "one who has under­
standing of his own uses and duties in the world";?^ his 
mind is always greater than the knowledge it contains and 
always is in total control of that knowledge. The mind of 
the uneducated but learned man is overwhelmed by facts, 
wholly trapped in a labyrinth of data. It is proper per­
spective that Ruskin calls for, rejection neither of science 
nor of learning in g e ne ra l. Scientific fact itself, such 
as that related to the chemistry of the painter's colors, 
can be of service to the artist, but it must not be confused 
with that unknowable genius of the finished work of art.
The three-volume study concludes with a lengthy 
assertion of the central premise of all his art criticism:
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Here, therefore, let me finally and firmly enunciate 
the great principle to which all that has hitherto 
been stated Is subservient: — that art Is valuable or 
otherwise, only as It expresses the personality, ac­
tivity, and living perception of a good and great 
human soul; that It may express and contain this with 
little help from execution, and less from science; and 
that If It have not this, if it shows not the vigor, 
perception, and invention of a mighty human spirit, It 
is worthless. Worthless, I mean, as art ; it may be 
precious in some other way, but, as art, It Is n u g a t o r y . ° 0
From this principle Ruskin reaffirms the Idea that photo­
graphic representation, whether through photography Itself 
or through drawing, does not constitute the vital element of 
artistic creation; rather, he Insists that man's spiritual 
condition Is primary. He argues that "social science" must 
become understood so that doctrines of liberty and equality 
can be more than words to be preached. By the conclusion 
of this work Ruskin is clearly concerned about the relation­
ship of environment to that Integration of sensibility 
essential to noble art. In a later writing the specific 
point of this principle Is clear when he argues that "the 
most noble and living literary faculties, like those of 
Scott and Dickens, are perverted by the will of the multi­
tude............ Social conditions which create the "multitude"
can and do distort man's right function. Art reflects that 
distortion.
The last three volumes of Modern Painters add little 
to the rather discursive aesthetic established In Huskin's 
preceding six volumes. Modern Painters III (1856) Is less 
organised In terms of a central topic than any of
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previous writings. This decentralized structure, dominant 
in his later essays and lectures, is suggested by the sub­
title to the volume, "Of Many Things."®^ The sweeping 
issues of Modern Painters _! and _II, discussion of the "Ideas" 
which can be received from art and of the functions of the 
imagination, are replaced by consideration of particular 
problems. Among the more significant of those problems is 
the universal-particular debate over the subject material 
proper to art, the nature of truth and beauty in the context 
of art, and the ideal relationship of the artist to feeling, 
defined by the expression pathetic fallacy. There are 
fewer extended descriptive passages of external nature, and 
Ruskin's style is, on the whole, less eloquent than it had 
been a decade earlier. Much more space is given to con­
sideration of specific aspects of existing works of art, 
now those of Titian and Veronese as well as those of Turner; 
the free-flowing passages centered in nature itself are no 
longer dominant.^3
Ruskin'E investigation of the "Grand Style" as dis­
cussed by Sir Joshua Reynolds in two Idler essays (seventy- 
nine and eighty-two ) leads him into the question of whether 
the artist should center his attentions on the universal 
and general or on the particular. In Modern Painters 1 
he had ;raised Turner's truth to nature while at the same 
time attacked direct imitation of external form. But in
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1Ô51 his defense of the Pre-Raphaelite painters suggested
a praise of minute detail and material accuracy; Holman
Hunt, for example, in order to produce "The Scapegoat," a
painting Ruskin publicly praised, traveled to Crimea to
create "as nearly as possible a representation of what an
ancient Israelite might have seen had he been standing on
the shores of the Dead Sea a few days after the Day of
Atonement."84 The discussion of Reynolds and the Grand
Style can easily and properly be read as an attempt by
Ruskin to resolve an apparent conflict in his own aesthetic.
A careful analysis of Reynolds' argument is developed in
which Ruskin in a relatively methodical manner illustrates
fallacies in the Idler essays. His central point, however,
is independently derived and has no logical relationship
with the discussion of Reynolds. Essentially Ruskin argues
that Reynolds' concern was misdirected, that an "instinctive
consciousness" guides the artist in choices which he cannot
rationally explain;
It is not true that Poetry does not concern herself 
with minute details. It is not true that high art 
seeks only the Invariable. It is not true that imi­
tative art is an easy thing. It is not true that the 
faithful rendering of nature is an employment in which 
"the slowest intellect is likely to succeed best."
All these successive assertions are utterly false and 
untenable, while the plain truth . . . /i£7 that the 
difference between great and mean art lies, not in 
definable methods of handling, or styles of represen­
tation, or choices of subjects, but wholly in the 
nobleness of the end to which the effort of the painteris addressed.
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He goes on to clarify his position in specific terms of the 
aesthetic of moral beauty dominant in his early writings:
"It does not matter whether he seek for his subjects among 
peasants or nobles, among the heroic or the simple, in courts 
or in fields, so only that he behold all things with a 
thirst for beauty, and a hatred of meanness and vice,"®^
This response to the topic is consistent with the 
central ideas of the previous volumes. By the conclusion 
of The Stones of Venice Ruskin is clearly convinced that 
upon hatred for meanness and vice love of beauty depends.
The principle of beauty as having a moral context is never 
absent in his thought, but it is central by the mid-1850's 
and the publication of Modern Painters III. Ruskin dis­
tinguishes between truth and beauty in systematic terms: 
truth is a property of statements, beauty a property of 
objects. They can thus be seen as independent of one an­
other.®? In art, however, the painter does express state­
ments in presenting that which claims to resemble objects 
in the surrounding world. Lines in a painting may be beau­
tiful, yet totally false in their representation; the most 
ugly work may express truthfully an aspect of external re­
ality, particularly for Ruskin a reality of modern life.
He argues, then, that while the artist can separate beauty 
and truth, he is wrong to do so. The greatest man seeks 
them "together in the order of their worthiness; that is 
to say, truth first, and beauty afterwards. High art dif-
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fers from low art In possessing an excess of beauty in 
addition to its truth, not in possessing excess of beauty 
inconsistent with truth.
It is this emphasis on truth which gives meaning to 
his discussion of the pathetic fallacy. Ruskin distinguishes 
two classes of poets. Those of the first order (Homer,
Dante, Shakespeare) feel and think strongly. The second 
order of poets (Keats, Tennyson) feel strongly but think 
weakly. Because they think less strongly than they feel, 
their vision is distorted by emotion and they see "untruly." 
Both orders exhibit essential feeling or pathos, but the 
greater poet subordinates it to truthful vision. A man who 
does not feel, who sees the world around him truthfully but 
without emotion, specifically love, is not a poet. The 
danger in the presence of feeling in art occurs only when 
that feeling is represented as truth, when it is deceptively 
fallacious. Ruskin's summation of his general discussion,
"the pathetic fallacy is powerful only so far as it is 
pathetic, feeble so far as it is fallacious, and . . . the 
domination of Truth is entire, over this, as over every 
other natural and just state of the human m i n d , " ® ^  ig clearly 
related to earlier statements of aesthetic principle. With­
out truth there is no valid statement, and without feeling 
there can be no art..
Ruskin continues to clarify his aesthetics and gradually
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to shift them to more overt social orientation in the con­
cluding volumes of Modem Painters. The emphasis placed on 
the naturalist ideal in The Stones of Venice, the idea that: 
the greatest artist is capable of accepting all of creation 
as worthy of his attention, is apparent to an even greater 
degree in Modern Painters IV and V. In I858 Ruskin's grad­
ual unwillingness to remain committed to evangelical "purism" 
climaxed when he left a chapel in Turin and before the works 
of Titian and Veronese asssrted that'A .good, stout, self- 
commanding, magnifiaient Animality is the make for poets 
and artists, it seems to H e . "92 This moment of praise for 
the naturalist ideal marks no great change in Buskin's 
aesthetics, but it records a conscious urge to divorce him­
self from the limitations of the vision prescribed by pietism. 
By the conclusion of Modern Painters his attention is clearly 
on social and moral problems o-f England and the destructive 
effect of those problems on art. "All great Art is P r a i s e , "92 
but the temper of his thought removes the aphorism from the 
chaoel to the street. In the closing chapter of Modern 
Painters V Ruskin's depression is obvious: "So far as in
it lay, this century has caused every one of its great men, 
whose hearts were kindest, and whose spirits most perceptive 
of the work of God, to die without hope;— Scott, Keats,
Byron, Shelley, Turner, Great England of the Iron-heart now, 
not of the Lion-heart. . . ."93 it is absolutely consistent
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that the essays of Unto This Last, traditionally accepted 
as Ruskin's public announcement of his shift from aesthetic 
to social concerns, contain only one explicit reference to 
art, Charles Dickens Is briefly mentioned, not for aes­
thetic reasons, but because Ruskin wishes him "studied with 
close and earnest care by persons Interested In social ques­
t i o n s . " - 4  j f  art reflects the condition of the artist and 
his world as Ruskin argues In both Modern Painters and The 
Stones of Venice, then objects of art become artifacts which 
can assist in the study of society.
The preceding summary Is selective and by no means 
complete. Its purpose Is solely to outline those aesthetic 
principles which have relevance to Ruskin's literary crit­
icism and particularly to the directions that criticism 
takes In the last three decades of his writing career. He 
was not openly concerned with Inconsistency of Ideas and.
In fact. In the preface to Modern Painters V argues that 
"All true oclnlons are living, and show their life by being 
capable of nourishment; therefore of c h a n g e . "95 %t is 
evident, however, from consideration of his response to the 
novel that his literary opinions are generally founded within 
the aesthetic pale of Modern Painters. The Seven Lamps of 
Architecture, and The Stones of Venice. In turning'.to 
Ruskin's criticism of the novel, it Is necessary to pause 
only to review Ruskin’s understanding of the term fiction.
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Several definitions were offered during the course of his 
long career, and they can be seen as a bridge between 
aesthetic theory and applied criticism.
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iRene Welleck, A History of Modern Criticism. Ill 
(New Haven, 1965)» p. 135.
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The fallacies inherent in definitions of the phrase (is 
Ruskin major because of the many volumes he wrote, because 
of the scope and relevance of his subject material, because 
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rently read?) negate the value of attempts at clarification.
^Ruskin's editors, Cook and Wedderbum, discuss the 
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^Works, III, p. 79.
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^*^Alba Warren (English Poetic Theory 1825-1865
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/Princeton, 1950/) argues that "perhaps the best word for 
Ruskin'8 criticism is humanistic" in that all man's works, 
artistic or other, derive their values "from the world of 
moral choice and action in which they have their being"
(p. 206 ).
^Ifhere are some twenty quotations from Wordsworth's 
poetry alone in Modern Painters I.
22works, III, pp. 177-178. Italics are Huskin's.
23works, III, pp. xxxvii-xxxix.
^^Works, IV, p. 26.
25#orks, IV, pp. 27-28.
26fierman, p. I96.
2?Henry Ladd provides a detailed discussion of Ruskin's 
concent of Theoria and the complex of ideas related to it 
(pp. 118-125).
28works, IV, p. 47.
29works. IV, p. 33. The term "aesthetic" as used in 
this study clearly differs from Ruskin's use of the term.
Here it is used to refer to artistic theory in general, 
whether related to painting, architecture, or literature.
For Ruskin the expression is used quite literally to mean 
sensual response to beauty.
30works, IV, p. 53. In the I883 edition of Modern 
Painters Ruskin reflects upon this passage as "the radical 
theorem, not only of this book, but of all mv writings on 
art."
31works, IV, p. 64.
^%orks , IV, p. 144.
^^Works, IV, p. 64.
54iyorks, IV, p. 147.
35Ladd, pp. 170'-183.
5°Works, IV, p. 36.
^"^Works, IV, p. 224.
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^^The Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, IV, "Lecture 
VII: Ben Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, and Massinger"
(New York, 1884), p. 256. Parallels between Ruskin's 
discussion to tne imagination and the organic nature of 
art to this essay: and to chapter thirteen of Biographia 
Literaria are clear despite Ruskin's concept of the fancy, 
noted below, and his insistence that all previous attempts 
to define the imagination have been in error. While the 
two theorists are frequently in agreement, Ladd suggests
(pp. 205-206).
^%orks , IV, PP . 239-240.
^Oworks, IV, p. 251.
Works, IV, p. 250.
4^Works, IV, p. 252.
4^Works, IV, p. 289.
4^Works, IV, p. 228.
^^Ladd also notes that Ruskin seems close to comment­
ing on the idealizing function of imagination in his dis­
cussion of the contemplative (pp. 215-216).
4^In an introductory note to the 1083 edition of the 
volume Ruskin rejected his distinction between fancy and 
imagination, arguing that "distinctions are scarcely more 
than varieties of courtesy or dignity in the use of words" 
(IV, pp. 219-220).
^7works, IV, p. 223. Morse Peckam's suggestion that 
Ruskin's art theory centered on the "innocent eye" as the 
primary equipment of the painter in recording the world 
around him must be qualified in _terms of Ruskin's statement 
here (Beyond the Tragic Vision /New York, 19627, up. 346-347 ).
48works. IV, pp. 260-262. 
49works, VIII, pp. 22-23. 
SOworks. VIII, p. 22. 
Slworka. VIII, p. I5. 
52works, VIII, p. 57.
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Works, VIII, p. 58. Ruskin's elaborate description 
of the process of the Imagination and his distinction be­
tween Imagination and fancy In Modem Painters II have little 
application In this volume. Reflecting on the passage 
quoted above, he asserts In i860, "A dream Is as real a 
fact, as a vision of reality: deceptive only If we do not
recognize It as a dream,"
5% o r k s . VIII, p. 102.
55works, VIII, pp. 59-40. Scholarship has not yet 
considered the parallels between Ruskin's ideas In this 
volume and those of Henry Adams In Mont-Salnt-Mlchel and 
Chartres and The Education of Henry Adams. One point of 
departure might be to consider the central adoration both
associate with the age of the great cathedrals as contrasted
with the very different orientation of the nineteenth- 
century mind.
S^Works, VIII, pp. 42-43.
57Works, VIII, p. 253.
58works, VIII, p. 214.
59works, VIII, p. 2l8.
GOworks, IX, p. 14.
^^Works. IX, p. 14.
^^Works, IX, pp. 68-69.
^3Works, IX, p. 71.
G^works, IX, pp. 71-72.
^^Ruskln's adherence to the concept of the Great 
Chain of Being, explicit here. Is suggested in much of his 
thought. Arthur 0. LoveJoy (The Great Chain of Being. A 
Study in the History of an Idea /Cambridge, Mass., 1936%) 
does not mention Ruskin, nor has this Important aspect of 
Ruskin's world view been discussed by other scholars.
G^Works, IX, p. 72.
57îhe city Itself, Ruskin suggests, has potential 
beauty if "its art and architecture are right" (IX, p. 411). 
In his rejection of fiction centered on the Victorian city,
It is clear that the requisite "rightness" was not found.
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^^Works, IX, pp. 409-410.
classifications of Venetian architecture are 
made by Ruskin.
?lThls and his discussion of the pathetic fallacy 
in Modem Painters III reveal significant aesthetic prin­
ciples of common knowledge to students of Victorian 
literature.
72works, X, p. 203.
73^0rks. X, p. 225.
'^\orks, V, pp. 111-119.
75works. X, pp. 226-227.
7Gworks. XI, p. 48.
77Works, XI, p. 49.
78work8, XI, p. 53.
7°Ruskin's lack of respect for philosophic writings 
has already been noted, but his full reasoning for the 
attitude is stated here; "Thus philology, logic, rhetoric, 
and the other sciences of the schools, being for the most 
part ridiculous and trifling, have so pestilent an effect 
upon those who are devoted to them, that their students 
cannot conceive any higher sciences than these, but fancy 
that all education ends in the knowledge of words : but the
true and great sciences, more especially natural history, 
make men gentle and modest in proportion to the largeness 
of their apprehension" (XI, p. 68).
SOworks, XI, pi.201.
Gl-Works, XXIX, pp. 317-318. This comment from Fors 
Clavigera (l878) is discussed more fully in the later dis­
cussion of Ruskin's criticism of the novel.
^^Ruskin's editors note that after ten years away from 
Modern Painters, Ruskin intended to complete it in one vol­
ume. In i860, after three additional volumes and pressure 
from his father. Modem Painters was ended rather than com­
pleted (V, p. 11 ; VII, pp. Iv-lvi).
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point here is that there is a relative differ­
ence in descriptive passages, not that Ruskin turns away 
from nature totally. All changes in Ruskin's thinking 
occur gradually over an extended period of time.
B^Herbert Sussman, "Hunt, Ruskin, and 'The Scapegoat,'" 
Victorian Studies, XII (September 1968), 87.
Q5Works, V, p. 42.
Goworks, V, pp. 42-43.
^?A mathematical process, for example, may be true 
but, because it is not visible, have no beauty. A flower 
may be beautiful, but it is not true or false since it 
expresses no statement (Works. V, p. 55).
88works, V, p. 56.
Q9works. V, p. 220.
90charles T. Dougherty ("Ruskin's Moral Argument") 
argues that the entire moral context of Ruskin*s aesthetic 
rests on the necessity of "feeling" which Dougherty defines 
as the artist's "love" for his subject. This essential 
love, neither sensually nor intellectually comprehensible, 
is reflective of the "other-regarding" relationship of artist 
to subject, a moral relationship.
91works. VIII, p. xl.
92Works. VII, p. 463. 
93works, VII, p. 455. 
94works. XVII, p. 31.
^^Works. VII, p. 9. In his inaugural address before 
the Cambridge School of Art Ruskin's apparent pride in 
inconsistency is less intellectually justified: "I am
never satisfied that I have handled a subject properly 
till I have contradicted myself at least three times."
CHAPTER III 
RUSKIN AND FICTION
As was noted early in this essay, Ruskin had an 
intensive, if unsystematic, contact with literature from 
early childhood. He was influenced to read and to write 
almost from infancy by a mother who had dedicated him before 
birth to the service of God and a father who saw in young 
John's first scribblings genius comparable to that of his 
own favorite poet, Lord Byron. Defoe, Bunyan, Scott, 
Wordsworth, Byron, and the Bible were a dominant part of 
his youth, although his early literary contact includes 
major figures from Spenser and Shakespeare to contemporary 
Romantic poets and novelists. He was able to read and write 
at the age of four and was paid by his parents for literary 
efforts, both in prose and verse,^ In 1830, then eleven 
years old, he recorded a visit to the Lake Di strict in the 
"Iteriad," a rhyming poem of more than two thousand lines. 
When the father in a letter to James Hogg in 1834 proudly 
wrote that his son had produced "thousands of lines," there 
was no exaggeration. In prose Ruskin's beginnings were less 
impressive, perhaps because his father favored verse, but 
there were several attempts at short fiction. Two stories, 
"Leoni; A Legend of Italy" (1836) and "The King of the Golden 
River" (l84l), have been published; they are imitative,
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heavily moralized sketches, neither of which suggests that 
Ruskin's talent lay In Imaginative storytelling.
While he did not fulfill the initial desires of 
either parent. Huskin's early and continuous contact with 
literature is reflected In direct statements and allusions 
throughout his long career as critic of art and society.
His first essay which can be considered explicit literary 
criticism was written for his tutor Reverend Thomas Dale In 
1836.2 In response to the topic, "Does the perusal of works 
of fiction act favorably on the moral character?," Ruskin 
develops a discussion of his own favorite authors, Sir Walter 
Scott, Lord Byron, and Bulwer.^ 'While no direct definition 
of the term fiction Is offered, he does provide detailed 
comment on the proper functions of literature, particularly 
of the novel. Using Scott's novels as Ideal examples, Ruskin 
asserts that fiction can have three positive effects on the 
mind. The reader's Involvement with scene and character and 
the feelings of love and benevolence which emerge from that 
Involvement have a humanizing Influence. The sympathetic 
responses of the reader purify his sense of himself, help 
him to put aside self and to see with benevolence the world 
around him. Secondly, the reader Is carried by an author's 
"transcendent and Infinitely superior Intellect" to know­
ledge of- the world by being shown "an infinite variety of 
scenes and circumstances."^ Such knowledge cultivates,
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polishes, and refines the reader in addition to broadening 
his intellect through the range of ideas presented. Finally, 
in the greatest authors the moral feelizngs of the reader are 
improved. Using Scott's fiction to illustrate, Ruskin defines 
this "moral tendency" as punishment of guilt, reward of 
virtue, and characterization of women as most exemplary when 
most prudent. He notes that such treatment of women may 
lead to less interesting and natural works but ultimately 
to more morally effective writing.
Ruskin suggests that objection to fiction as injurious 
and immoral rests primarily on the distorted premise that 
"whatever Is amusing must be criminal; that a grave counte­
nance and severe demeanour are the true signs of sanctity 
of mind and consequent morality of conduct; that austerity 
Is the companion of innocence, and gloom, of religion."5 
He Is willing to admit the possibility that excessive contact 
with works of fiction may lead to an unnatural urge for 
excitement or a "morbid state of mind" but Insists that 
moderate reading Is beneficial to both Intellectual powers 
and morality. The young writer's apparent "liberalism" here 
should not be overemphasized. The tract to which Ruskin"s 
essay Is probably a response was extremely Puritanical, too 
extreme even for Reverend Dale in its attempt to sweep Byron, 
Moore, Hume, Paine, Scott, Bulwer, and Cooper "from the 
libraries of all virtuous m e n . H i s  enthusiasm for both
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prose and poetry in his defense of fictional literature is 
always a defense of its moral values. That fiction which 
he considers trite, centered upon false sentiment, is passed 
over as unworthy of comment, and he makes no comment what­
soever about fiction of topical relevance, that "realistic" 
writing he was later to abhor. The essay does, however, 
provide evidence that Ruskin accepted early the premise which 
pervades Modern Painters and later writings, that beauty has 
a basis in truth and must always be understood in a moral 
context.
The most explicit definition of fiction proposed by
Ruskin appears in the fifth of a series of essays, Fiction,
Fair and Foul,? written in I88I, forty-five years after the
"Essay on Literature." The definition is stated in terms of
a Greek vase, a "symbol of fair fiction," "the best type of
it being the most fictile":
A thing which has two sides to be seen, two handles 
to be carried by, and a bottom to stand on, and a top 
to be poured out of, this, every right fiction is. 
whatever else it may be. Planned rigorously, rounded 
smoothly, balanced symmetrically, handled handily, 
lipped softly for pouring out oil and wine. Painted 
daintily at last with images of eternal things-- 
"For ever shalt thou love, and she be fair."®
He explains the definition in terms more literally related 
to literature in following passages, and, since the essay 
centers upon the novel as a dominant fictional form, Ruskin’s 
explanation is primarily related to that type of prose fic­
tion.9 The creator of "fair fiction" has total control over
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form, "not, a stone useless, not a word nor an Incident thrown 
away," andthe world of the story moves with "unfelt swift­
ness," with no sense of falsity or contrivance. Moral 
balance should be achieved, with proper division of good 
and evil, not simply the endless recording of either good 
or evil. The finished work is totally comprehensible by 
the reader in its structure and content, always illustrating 
the "kindness and comfort" Ruskin finds in Keats' line.
As early as the third volume of Modern Painters Ruskin 
insists that full life demands seriousness of pursuit. If 
senseless fiction, that which depends upon "the prolongation 
from age to age of romantic historical deceptions instead 
of sifted truth," is man's source of pleasure, he will lose 
sight of the reality of the world around him.^O A literary 
work, just as any other object of art, has value only so 
long as it does not mislead the observer concerning the 
nature of reality itself. Consistent with this principle 
Ruskin has disdain for all fiction which makes use of tradi­
tional pastoral subject material and language. In somewhat 
the same tone as Dr. Johnson's comments on Lycldas. Ruskin 
asserts that such usage "for the most part corresponds in 
its aim and rank, as compared with other literature, to the 
porcelain shepherds and shepherdesses on a chimney-piece as 
compared with great works of s c u l p t u r e . " T r u e  pastoral," 
he argues, does not depend on brooks "purlins." birds
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"warbling," and mountains that "lift their horrid peaks above 
the clouds"; his objection Is against those fixed Ideas about 
external nature which keep man from seeing what Is before 
him. Ruskin finds only two works of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries which merit even qualified praise for 
proper treatment of subject material, The Comoleat Angler 
and The Vicar of Wakefield. In these works there Is a notable 
sense of sympathy or feeling, but only as related to nature 
as a "series of green fields"; there Is no evidence of 
response to the uncommon and the sublime.
Huskin's position Is more than a brief affirmation of 
the preference for particularity frequently Identified with 
nineteenth-century Romanticism. His essential contention 
from Modern Painters I throughout his works Is that through 
Imagination the artist sees, reveals, and records truth 
(In Modern Painters II by means of the associative, penetra­
tive, and contemplative functions of the Imagination); any 
art which deceives the observer concerning truth Is false.
A literature which presents a farmer's daughter as a "nymph" 
or his son as a "swain" la untrue. Huskin's attention here 
Is more directly on the artist's ability and willingness 
to see and feel than It Is on the debate over particularity 
or universality as the proper guide In his choice of subject 
material. The discussion of the pathetic fallacy in Modern
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Painters III suggests a dominant principle here in the 
central idea that the greatest poetry reflects feeling 
consistent with truth.
Prose fiction In Its highest form, like great poetry,
Is produced by men of feeling or sentiment, A writer who 
sees clearly but without feeling may produce a truthful 
statement, but he will not create noble art. The work of 
such a writer, in Ruskin's Judgment, will reflect a lack of 
Imaginative power. Through Voltaire's prose and poetry, for 
example, can be seen "a man whose head was as destitute of 
Imaginative power as It is possible for the healthy cerebral 
organization of a highly developed mammalian to be," but,
Ruskin argues, "Voltaire's wit, and reasoning faculties, 
are nearly as strong as his Imagination Is w e a k . "12 Voltaire's 
Indignation against Injustice Is praiseworthy, and Is even 
based on pathetic motives, but the writer has not the Imag­
inative faculties to understand or reveal those motives.
Ruskin praises Candide for its acute reasoning while con­
demning Its "entire vacuity of Imagination." He argues that 
the Imaginative power purifies while lack of It defiles; 
thus, Ruskin finds In Voltaire, and In Pope and Horace as 
well, a "foulness of thought" which taints their work for 
all Its Illustration of brilliant rational power. Thi3 
taint can be found In all but those writers whose "colossal 
powers of Imagination result In absolute virginal purity of
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thought," Pindar, Homer, Virgil, Dante, and Scott. Others—
Aristophanes, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Fielding—
occasionally reveal the unsympathetic or unimaginative in
their writings, but in their most noble work "throw off"
this aspect of their nature.13
The imaginative power which permits expression of
feeling must, of course, be truthful. As would be expected
from Ruskin's comments on the falsity of "pastoral" literature,
he rejects all literary usage which only affects feeling.
The nature of false sentiment is vividly illustrated by a
brief scene in which:
elegant lawyers' clerks, who, having obtained a fort­
night's leave of absence, are brought down per steamer 
to Edinburgh, and then, the Lady of the Lake in their 
pocket and a new silk umbrella in their hand, peram­
bulate, with open mouth and upturned eyes, the "hawful 
shoeblimities" of the Scotch H i g h l a n d s . 1 4
Such a scene, or one in which young men read "Romeo and 
Juliet, do the despairing lover, and get the colic," does 
not reflect true feeling in the writer. This sort of vacuity 
of both truth and sentiment Ruskin seldom discusses except 
in the most brief and passing manner. He suggests that 
such novels should not be the sole reading of the young lady, 
"heaped up in her lap as they fall out of the package of 
the circulating library," but he argues that "the worst 
romance is not so corrupting as false history, false phil­
osophy, or false political essays."15 The primary danger 
Ruskin sees in any fictional work is the possibility that
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it may make life seem uninteresting and increase the reader's, 
appetite for scenes and events unrelated to his actual life.
It is clear from Ruskin's emphasis upon truth as well 
as sentiment that he credits the novel with a potentially 
serious function aside from direct entertainment. Arguing 
the necessity of controlling shadow in architecture in The 
Seven Lamps of Architecture, he illustrates by shifting to 
a discussion of literature. He asserts that works of art 
which have use and influence in man's lives express a meas­
ure of human sympathy by reflecting darkness "as great as 
there is in human life," and that:
the great poem and great fiction generally affect us 
most by the majesty of their masses of shade, and 
cannot take hold upon us if they affect a continuance 
of lyric sprightliness, but must be often serious, 
and sometimes melancholy, else they do not express 
the truth of this wild world of ours.16
In later statements Ruskin moves beyond this note that
significant fiction must be serious, as life itself is
serious, to a direct appeal for didactic literature. As
he became disillusioned with the répertoriai nature of the
contemporary novel in the l870's and l880's, the desire for
a fiction which teach.es "the difference between finite and
infinite knowledge, of certain laws of moral retribution,"
is more evident.1? The subjects of such stories, Ruskin
suggests, should be from common life rather than from high
station so as to provide examples within the sight and
events within the experience of the reader.
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Despite his rather explicit concept of fiction and 
opinions concerning the subject material proper to it, Ruskin 
gives little advice related to the educative values of the 
novel or even to which books should be read by the young. 
Advising art students on proper reading material, only 
magazines and review literature are explicitly forbidden.^® 
Richardson, Scott, and Miss Edgeworth are suggested as worthy 
novelists, but the weight of choice is left on the student 
who is told, "If you don't like the first book you try, seek 
for another." Ruskin does insist that time and diligence 
must be given to reading, and he warns his students to cen­
ter their attention, not on plot, but on acquaintance with 
the characters, the "pleasant people," the writer creates.
In another context, discussing the education of young ladies, 
Ruskin asserts that even the best fiction has little likeli­
hood of greatly influencing its reader:
The utmost they /novel^ usu ally do is to enlarge 
somewhat the charity of a kind reader, or the bitter­
ness of a malicious one; for each will gather, from 
the novel, food for her own disposition. Those who 
are naturally proud and envious will learn from 
Thackeray to dispise humanity; those who are naturally 
gentle, to pity it; those who are naturally shallow, 
to laugh at it.19
Thus, even in his call for a didactic fiction, there is no
confidence that the reader will be greatly influenced by
any single novel. If entertainment is the sole motive for
reading, then the moral truth of a work is not likely to
move the reader, and if the individual is conditioned, for
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example, by the problems of life in an industrial city, 
he will not be able to see or respond to a truthful repre­
sentation of rural life in fiction.
The position here is close to the principle stated 
and restated in Modern Painters, that the effectiveness of 
all art depends on the observer's ability to see clearly. 
Viewers, Ruskin argues, misunderstand Turner's representation 
of landscape because they have been conditioned by seeing 
false art rather than by studying external nature itself 
and letting themselves respond to those ideas of beauty 
painting can express. By the l870's and l880's, when most 
of his comment on fiction is written, Ruskin is less con­
fident that man can easily be re-educated in a society 
which he sees as diseased; as a result, his appeal for a 
fiction of moral truth is made without confidence that such 
literature will be understood.
If his hope for the effectiveness of fiction is weak, 
his faith in the great artist to produce despite all adver­
sity is strong. Chastising the false values of contemporary 
society in Fors Clavigera, a long series of public letters, 
Ruskin asserts:
There are a few, a very few persons born in each 
generation, whose words are worth hearing, whose art 
is worth seeing. These born few will preach, or sing, 
or paint, in spite of you; they will starve like grass­
hoppers, rather than stop singing; and even if you 
don't choose to listen, it is charitable to throw them 
a few crumbs to keep them a l i v e . 20
He goes on to attack all who write only for profit or to
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be genteel, saying that such are "more contemptible than 
common beggars." Noble literature is created out of "love 
and truth," a condition of the artist which a perceptive 
viewer can see reflected in the work of art. Ultimately 
the writer, in his total commitment to his art, carries out 
a mythic function. Ruskin defines the novel as myth in 
the same sense that some Greek literature is myth; the 
common element is "moral purpose." This purpose, "partly 
beyond the consciousness of the storyteller himself," 
establishes the novel as existing within an archetypal 
context.21 The point is not developed further in specific 
terms of the novel, but the simple assertion suggests the 
importance Ruskin places on the writer's function in the 
full sweep of human history.
The specific responses Ruskin makes to the novel are 
frequently stated in subjective terms; he had a long and 
personal contact with the genre, but his opinions and atti­
tudes are in the main consistent with the points outlined 
above. In reviewing his orlticism.of particular novels 
and novelists, it is convenient to consider three general 
areas of response. Much of his judgment of fiction is in 
biographical and historical terms, derived from the implicit 
assumption that fi.ction emerges out of the general cultural 
and direct physical experiences of the author. Secondly, 
the moral truth of individual works of fiction is an
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everpresent topic for investigation by Ruskin. Finally, 
he attacks all literature -which he considers tainted by 
the unhealthy social and moral conditions of the Victorian 
world. These areas of discussion are clearly interrelated; 
there are few topics in the entire body of Ruskin's work 
which are totally isolated. These are, however, dominant 
areas which can illustrate an aspect of consistency in 




^Works, I, p. xxvi. A reader Interested in Ruskin's 
first efforts in verse and prose should refer to the first 
two volumes of the Library Edition. While they do not 
establish young Ruskin as a potential Lord Byron, the vo­
cabulary and digressive tendency of the child foreshadow 
his later work, as does the sheer volume he produced.
2works, I, pp. 357-375.
^Apparently the enthusiasm for Bulwer (Bulwer-Lytton 
after 1843) waned; aside from one passing mention of him 
in a letter in 1840, there are no other references in 
Ruskin's works.
4works, I, pp. 365-366.
5Works, I, p. 358.
^Works, I, pp. 357-358. Ruskin's editors conclude 
that the '‘Essay on Literature" is a response to Reverend 
John Todd's The Student's Guide. Dale had issued an edition 
of Todd's popular tract in 1036, although his granddaughter 
has argued that he was not in full agreement with Todd, an 
American divine.
7works, XXXIV, pp. 265-394.
Qworks, XXXIV, p. 370. The highly figurative manner
of this definition is typical of Ruskin's later prose. His
misquotation of Keats is also typical, since he generally
quoted from memory.
9While Ruskin occasionally refers to types of prose 
fiction other than the novel, to short stories for example, 
his references to novels are overwhelmingly dominant. The 
occasional implicit equating of the terms novel and prose 
fiction is a matter of convenience in this particular study, 
not a failure to distinguish between the terms when such 
distinction is relevant.
^QWorks, V, p. 100.
llWorks. XII, pp. 118-119.
iZWorks, XXXIV, pp. 629-630.
l^Works. XXXIV, pp. 630-631.
l4works. I, p. 369.
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ISworks. XVIII, p. 129.
l^Works. VIII, p. 116.
ITworks, XXXII, p. 5.
iGworks, XV, pp. 226-228.
19Works, XVIII, p. 130. Ruskin's position here is 
close to that of Milton in Areopasitica.
20%ork8, XXVIII, p. 646.
21works, XXIX, p. 588. Harold Bloom in his introduction 
to The Literary Criticism of John Ruskin. cited earlier, sees 




The general directions of Ruskin's literary criticism 
can be anticipated even from the brief summaries of aes­
thetic principles and attitudes toward fiction that have 
been provided. Truth and sentiment, a measure of the qual­
ity of the creator's imagination, are the essentials of all 
art. For those whose sight is not distorted, the object 
of art is a mirror in which the physical and moral conditions 
of both artist and society are reflected. The greatest art 
emerges from an artist whose vision is clear, who intuitively 
achieves the proper balance of truth and feeling, whose life 
is aesthetically "right." Because for Ruskin environment 
has an overwhelming power over all but the most noble men, 
and a considerable influence even on them, great art will 
rarely emerge from a society that is not itself aesthetically 
"right." Thus his literary criticism is frequently allied 
to biographical and social comment. An art which deceives 
its audience as to the nature of truth is not moral. Just 
as art produced by a man of weak imagination cannot be 
beautiful. The frequently quoted aphorism, "All great 
art is praise,"! is centrally an affirmation of the potential 
of great art to achieve moral beauty.
The majority of Ruskin's criticism of prose fiction
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appears in two works, Fiction. Fair and Foul and Fors 
Clavigera. The former, published in the periodical 
Nineteenth Century, appeared between June I88O and October 
1881. The five essays of Fiction. Fair and Foul touch on 
many literary figures, both poets and novelists, but the 
majority of space is given to discussion of nineteenth- 
century novelists.2 The latter, a series of "Letters to 
the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain," Includes 
ninety-six separate essays written between January I87I 
and December 1884.3 jn ten of these essays Ruskin provides 
explicit discussion of either novelists or their works.
Most of these references are to Sir Walter Scott, to his 
life and his work. While there are comments about literature 
from the first volume of Modem Painters throughout his 
writings, it should be noted that these two principal works 
appear from ten to twenty-five years after Modern Painters 
V, the final volume in which Ruskin is generally thought to 
be primarily concerned with the aesthetics of art. The 
dominant principle of his writings after i860 centers upon 
what might be called an aesthetic of life, suggested by the 
aphorism, "There is no wealth but life. The later crit­
icism of fiction, as might be expected, reflects this relative 
shift in orientation.
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The Moral Function of the Novel 
The moral beauty which Ruskin sees as the essence 
of all great art has been discussed previously In aesthetic 
terms. In specific criticism of the novel he notes the 
source of the creative Impulse, the Immediate physical 
qualities of moral art, Its possible didactic purpose, and 
the potential effectiveness of that didacticism. Ruskin 
asserts on several occasions that great artists create 
Intuitively, that they cannot explain the total artistic 
process, and that no critic can reduce the object of art 
to a systematic pattern of rules. Walter Scott, for Ruskin 
the greatest of modern novelists, produced his best works 
without significant conscious effort, working only a few 
hours each day. His novels provide proof that "If a great 
thing can be done at all. It can be done easily."5 This 
Ideal process of creation results In an art expressive of 
universal or divine truth, the artist being an Instrument 
for such expression. Ruskin writes of the Iliad, the 
Inferno, Pilgrim's Progress, and the Faerie Q.ueene as "true 
dreams," and he defines those dreams as coming to men In 
the "deep, living sleep which God sends, . . . the revealer 
of secrets."G The highest levels of moral beauty are 
achieved, then, by that artist whose sense of truth and 
whose Imagination are harmonious with divine or universal 
truth and beauty.
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The vast majority of artistic effort does not achieve 
such moral beauty, and Ruskin quite reasonably centers his 
literary criticism on those works which are less than ideal. 
He praises novels that provide either implicit or explicit 
moral principles, provided those principles are not pre­
sented in a "moralizing" or sentimental manner. In Scott's 
treatment of love and marriage Ruskin finds an exemplary 
presentation of calm, resolution, chastity, and courage, 
Scott's characters reveal a moral structure in which they 
would be "embarrassed by the consequences of their levity 
or imprudence." Marriage is not the sole business of exist­
ence, nor is love the only reward of virtue.7 The prudence 
Scott's characters express, Diana Vernon in Rob Roy and 
Jeanie Deans in Heart of Midlothian expecially, Ruskin 
praises as illustrative of an honorable morality generally 
absent in lesser fiction. The centering of a story on love 
and marriage also leads to abandonment of the grander de­
signs of human experience and, thus, to a loss of artistic 
perspective.® The two great moral principles illustrated 
in Scott's novels are truth and courage, Ruskin asserts.
To Scott they are inseparable qualities.° Ruskin thinks it 
a weakness that "animal courage" is frequently the basis of 
all other virtue in Scott, but he praises the refusal of 
the novelist to show mercy for a coward. A lengthy dis­
cussion of Andrew Fairservice and Richie Moniplies,
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characters in Rob Roy and The Fortunes of Nisei respectively, 
is developed to illustrate the truth and courage which are 
central to Scott's fiction. In Fairservice, "driven out at 
the kitchen door," and Moniplies, rising in rank and power, 
winning a wife in battle, Ruskin finds Scott's consistent 
and praiseworthy treatment of c o u r a g e . 1 0
Using the s ame two characters to illustrate, Ruskin 
discusses the basic religious code he finds in Scott's 
fiction. Both figures emerge from a Presbyterian environment, 
but Fairservice's "scornfully exclusive dogmatism, which 
is indeed the distinctive plague-spot of the lower evan­
gelical sect everywhere" is absent in Richie Moniplies.H 
Ruskin asserts that Scott presents in Moniplies a high 
level of religious morality. The character is little asso­
ciated with the dogma of Presbyterianism:
In Richie, it has little to do; his conscience being, 
in the deep of it, frank and clear. His religion 
commands him nothing which he is not at once ready to 
do, or has not habitually done; and it forbids him 
nothing which he is unwilling to forego. He pleads no 
pardon from it for known faults; he seeks no evasions 
in the letter of it for violations of its spirit. We 
are scarcely therefore aware of its vital power in him, 
unless at moments of very grave feeling and its neces­
sary expression. . . .12
Moniplies is neither an independent nor a non-conformist;
he is orthodox in the full sense of his religion, lacking
any mark of hypocrisy. Using these two figures as typical,
Ruskin suggests that in characters throughout his works
Scott asserts a distinctly religious morality of faith.
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submission, affection, and comfort without severity and 
resignation.
Arguing that the moral purpose of the whole of Scott's 
fiction Is Inseparably related to study of the effects of 
true and false religion on conduct, Ruskin arranges sig­
nificant figures In five groups. The lowest rank of char­
acters Includes those who hold to the general truths of 
evangelicalism but transfer those truths to their own 
passions and by this process can Justify any crime or vio­
lence. The second group consists of believers who restrain 
themselves from crime and violence but are not capable of 
overcoming self-interest and small temptations. The third 
order Is of those naturally Just and honest characters whose 
excessive pride often makes them censorious and tiresome.
The fourth rank Includes that class of figures whose enthu­
siasm, particularly when directed toward missionary effort, 
often leads to martyrdom. The fifth and highest rank of 
characters In Scott's fiction consists of those who are 
"always gentle, entirely firm, the comfort and strength of 
all around them; merciful to every human fault, and submis­
sive without anger to every human o p p r e s s i o n . F r o m  this 
rather elaborate classification It Is clear that Ruskin 
values Scott primarily for the principles of conduct estab­
lished through characterization. Much of Ruskin's comment 
on the novel Is, In fact, character study; discussion of
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plot and other aspects of the genre is frequently directed 
toward establishing a point related to character development. 
Scott's novels are significant because they offer patterns 
of conduct truthfully and with sentiment.
One weakness Ruskin finds in Maria Edgeworth's fiction 
is a failure to develop characters fully, to provide details 
which will make it possible for the reader to have a sense 
of familiarity with each figure in a story. He suggests 
that this occurs in her fiction because of her concern with 
morality to such an extent that she frequently loses sight 
of setting, plot, and character.14 in the early "Essay on 
Literature" the didactic aspect of her work was dismissed 
as "the decidedly and professedly moral fictions of the 
Edgeworth and Sherwood school."15 Ruskin's most pointed 
attack on Maria Edgeworth, however, is directed, not at 
excessive moralizing, but at the moral or philosophical 
system itself which she accepts. He argues that the stoicism 
expressed in Dr. Johnson's "The Vanity of Human Wishes" was 
acceptable to eighteenth-century figures but has no place 
in nineteenth-century thought. Miss Edgeworth, he asserts, 
is one of the many who stoically accept the "glorious dis­
covery of the civilized age," and even go so far as to pro­
claim its arrival triumphantly "with bray of penny trumpets 
and blowing of steam-whistles."1^ This implicit acceptance 
of utilitarianism is rejected by Ruskin as false; it weakens
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the potential moral power of her fiction.
Ruskin is consistent in his refusal to accept sent­
imentality in fiction, of which he considers Maria Edgeworth's 
treatment of morality but one form. He particularly attacks 
excessive concern with emotion itself:
the mass of sentimental literature, concerned with 
the analysis and description of emotion . . .  is 
altogether of lower rank than the literature which 
merely describes what it saw. . . . And, generally 
speaking, pathetic writing and careful explanation 
of passion are quite easy, compared with this plain 
recording of what people said and did, or with the 
right invention of what they are likely to say and do; 
for this reason, that to invent a story, or admirably 
and thoroughly tell any part of a story, it is nec­
essary to grasp the entire mind of every personage 
concerned in it, and know precisely how they would be 
affected by what happens; which to do requires a 
colossal intellect. . . .^7
The flaw in the writer who produces sentimental fiction 
is, then, the inability or unwillingness to see, imagine, 
and record truthfully. There is a distortion of truth 
as well as feeling in such literature which relegates it 
to an inferior position. Just as Claude's landscapes are 
inferior to those of Turner, because they are untrue.
Ruskin's suggestion that Charles Kingsley’s novels be 
removed from Sir John Lubbock's "List of the Best Hundred 
Books" is based on this principle; Kingsley's novels are 
false because, "People who buy cheap clothes are not pun­
ished in real life by catching fevers; social inequalities 
are not to be redressed by tailors falling in love with 
bishops' daughters, or gamekeepers with squires'. . . ."18
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Sentimentality frequently occurs when an author feels 
compelled to follow the tastes of his audience. Public 
desire leads an otherwise superior author into unmotivated 
and unjustified dwelling on sickness and violence. Ruskin 
illustrates his point by noting that little Nell in The 
Old Curiosity Shop "was simply killed for the market, as 
a butcher kills a lamb."19 He similarly finds passages 
in Scott inferior because they are colored to be acceptable 
to the audience or arbitrarily expanded to lengthen the 
total work. Unlike Dickens, however, Scott never dwells 
upon the pathos of the sickroom in order to record the last 
syllables of the suffering patient. The low point in literary 
"anatomical preparations for the general market" is Wilkie 
Collins' Poor Miss Finch, a novel in which "the heroine 
is blind, the hero epileptic, and the obnoxious brother is 
found dead with his hands dropped off, in the Arctic regions."2^ 
In the novels of his ovna day, Ruskin notes, such exploita­
tion of emotion is common; truthful and imaginative pre­
sentation is the exception.21
Ruskin states with absolute certainty that all great 
art, "every great piece of painting or literature— without 
any exception, from the birth of Man to this hour— is an 
assertion of moral law. as strict, when we examine it, as 
the Eumenides or the Divina Commedia."22 The specific 
design of great fiction must be such as to assert visible
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Justice; the presentation of "good and gentle persons in 
unredeemed distress or destruction" may be interesting, but 
it will not convey moral power. Catastrophe should have a 
clear cause in the violation of moral law, even when it 
admits the ultimate mystery of human fate. Rejecting Balzac 
and George Sand as "good novelists" but incapable of noble 
moral design, Ruskin turns again to Scott, with particular 
reference to Heart of Midlothian. This novel is credited 
in two instances as the greatest of Scott's works, here 
for the proper expression of moral law.25 Reward and pun­
ishment derive explicitly from the virtues and vices of the 
major characters. Jeanie Deans' "absolute truth and faith" 
make it proper that whatever suffering she must endure 
ultimately leads to a prosperous and peaceful life for her­
self. By the same reasoning the falsehood and vanity of 
her sister Effie and the pride of their father David Deans 
lead properly to familial separation and humiliation. No 
victory or defeat in this novel, Ruskin suggests, is unre­
lated to the basic design, that moral cause-effect pattern 
which is the essence of great fiction.
Although Ruskin occasionally praises didacticism, he 
is not convinced of the effectiveness of didactic literature 
on human conduct. He distinguishes. Oliver Twist as Dickens' 
greatest novel primarily because it "is an earnest and 
uncaricatured record of states of criminal life, written
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with didactic purpose, full of the gravest instruction."24 
Similarly he suggests in a fictitious conversation with a 
group of young girls in The Ethics of the Dust that they 
read Miss Edgeworth's novels because there is "no one who 
tells you more truly how to do right." As in other refer= 
ences to Edgeworth, however, he notes that while "her exam­
ples of conduct and motive are wholly admirable," her 
"representation of events is false and misleading," because 
the balanced patterns of great literature are absent.25 
The assumption of the didactic writer that "noble training 
and right principle can always give the power of self-command" 
is not fully acceptable to Ruskin.26 Vftiile he can admire 
didacticism, he admits uncertainty that education derived 
from such material has great influence. Ruskin suggests 
that Shakespeare's emphasis on passion as the dominant prin­
ciple in Miranda's character is worthy of consideration also, 
and that although the rule of passion is by no means noble, 
it should not be discounted.
Ruskin credits fiction, however, with influencing his 
own life. In Praeterita, an incomplete autobiography, he 
credits Richardson's Sir Charles Grandison with having a 
"greater practical effect on me for good" than any other 
single w o r k . 27 Por that effect Richardson's novel is placed 
above all others Ruskin has read. In a similar manner he 
praises the "imaginative teaching" of Defoe and Bunyan, the
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earliest fictional influences on his life.28 More specif­
ically, Ruskin notes that his own literary style and even 
his view of external nature have been influenced by liter­
ature. He relates the shaping of the former directly to 
having Johnson, Goldsmith, and Richardson constantly read 
to him as a child.29 His comments on the latter are consis­
tent with the assertions in Modern Painters that man sees 
what he is conditioned to see. The reading of Maria 
Edgeworth's stories, with their descriptions of external 
nature, gave "an almost romantic and visionary charm to 
mineralogy" for young Ruskin traveling through Scotland 
and on the Continent with his parents.50 He acknowledges 
that he was much influenced in what he saw by frequent 
contact with her works.
Ruskin is more convinced of the influence of fiction 
on himself than he is of its effectiveness in society in 
general. He argues that Bunyan's prose, along with Paradise 
Lost, "formed the English Puritan mind,"51 but this is the 
only example of influential fiction he gives. In another 
instance, discussing the English court system, he cites 
Dickens, but only .on hearsay, noting that he "wrote with 
a definitely reforming purpose, seemingly; and, I have 
heard, had real effects on Chancery practice."52 Four 
years earlier, however, writing in I870 soon after Dickens' 
death, Ruskin says that his novels had no influence, that
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their finest points are undiscovered by the reading public, 
although Dickens' "liberalism" may have been attractive to 
his audience.55 Ruskin is certain of the potential of the 
great writer to influence his audience, but he finds little 
evidence of that potential being developed in his own society. 
In 1873, reviewing the literary careers of Miss Edgeworth, 
Scott, Dickens, and Thackeray, he is unable to discover 
"what essential good has been effected by them, though they 
all had the best intentions."54 Scott and Edgeworth are 
ironically credited with influence for good, "because nobody 
now will read them," but in general society is changed in 
no positive way by their fiction.
Scott is praised at length for the "good . . .  he has 
in him to do," even though Ruskin greatly doubts whether the 
novelist has had any observable influence on his audience.
The potential of his fiction centers upon his sense of 
honor in men and women, "his conception of purity in woman" 
which Ruskin asserts is higher than Dante's, "his reverence 
for the filial relation" which may be compared to Virgil's, 
and his universal sympathy.55 Ruskin argues that if an 
individual reader approaches fiction seriously, with a desire 
to learn, he can gain much f ran it. Advising a student to 
read Waverley rather than more complex works, Ruskin's 
instructions clearly define the didactic possibilities he 
credits to the novel:
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Read your Waverley, I repeat, with extreme care: and 
of every important person in the story, consider first 
what the virtues are; then what the faults inevitable 
to them by nature and breeding; then what the faults 
they might have avoided; then what the results to them 
of their faults and virtues, under the appointment of 
fate.
Do this after reading each chapter; and write down 
the lessons which it seems to you that Scott intended 
in it; and what he means you to admire, what to despise.
The clear implication of Ruskin*a comments on the
effectiveness on fiction in the nineteenth century is that
few will read with this essential diligence, and, as a
result, the moral potential of the great writer will be
unrealized. Didacticism itself is acceptable in the novel
if it is not so excessive as to unbalance the relationship
of truth and feeling necessary to great art. Emphasis on
emotion leads to a similar loss of balance, a condition of
sentimentality which weakens the total work. Recognizing
the potential positive influence of literature on society,
Ruskin nevertheless finds nothing in his culture comparable
to the influence of literature on his own life. The implied
conclusion of his comments on fiction is that art does not
shape society. Unless the reader is receptive and committed
to the structures presented by the writer, literature can
only entertain, a function which is, in its escapism,
ignoble.
The Historical and Biographical Context of the Novel 
If Ruskin is convinced that society is not shaped by
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art, he Is also certain of the overwhelming influence of 
environment on the formation and development of literature.
The structure, characterization, morality, and even dialect 
patterns of individual novels he traces to sources in cul­
tural history and in the personal experience of the writer, 
much of what can generally be classified as Ruskin's literary 
criticism is, in fact, historical and biographical survey.
He goes beyond the premise that historical and biographical 
knowledge creates a context which broadens one's response 
to fiction to the implicit position that such knowledge is 
essential to proper understanding of a literary work. He 
argues, for example, that the false pastoralism of eighteenth- 
century literature, noted in the previous chapter, was 
dictated by the mores of English society, and he credits 
orientation toward concern for "actual" external nature in 
part to the French R e v o l u t i o n . The large body of comment 
on Sir Walter Scott and his novels centers in study of 
Scott's ancestry, has personal experiences, and the immediate 
cultural patterns, particularly religious, of Scotland.
Scott, as has been noted, was Ruskin's favorite novelist, 
and it is not unusual that in discussing his work Ruskin 
gives much more attention to these issues than he does 
with other writers.
Ruskin asserts that Scott's sense of honor, that 
quality evident in his fiction, was Inbred. Study of his
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ancestry can elucidate the "subtlety of design" in his 
poetry and prose by revealing the history which filled his 
mind. In order to illustrate these two points Ruskin traces 
Scott's lineage from Wat of Harden, a sixteenth-century 
figure, through six generations.^8 He relates a rescue by 
Wat of Harden's wife of an English child from her husband's 
men, noting a traditional belief that the child grew up to 
become a creator of Scottish border songs. Noting Sir 
Walter's yearly pilgrimage to visit the place from which 
the name Harden is derived, Ruskin concludes that he drew 
the central theme of his poem "The Lay of the Last Minstrel" 
from this ancestor's history. Wat of Harden was a marauder 
whose primary source of income was derived from theft of 
livestock. Ruskin argues, however, that in sixteenth-century 
Scotland, "open thieving had no dishonesty in it what . 
ever."59 He places such a "profession" next to farming as 
the most honorable means of getting a living, far above law, 
the ministry, writing, painting, and other means of liveli­
hood which generally owe their success to pleasing the 
public.
The honor, dignity, and purity of each of Scott's 
forebears is illustrated to suggest the source of those 
qualities in Sir Walter and in his works. In addition, 
specific events in the ancestors' lives, Ruskin asserts, 
are reproduced in his fiction. In Wat of Harden's son.
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Sir William, Ruskin finds the strong religious faith and 
passion of Scotland. After relating the story of Sir 
William's marriage, he recounts how, when it was discovered 
that his son Walter and the son's wife had been converted 
to the Quaker faith, the father obtained an order from the 
Privy Council of Scotland to imprison both and take their 
children from them.^O The children were, by this separation 
and education under their grandfather's eye, "cured of 
Quakerism," the youngest, Walter Scott, Tutor of Raeburn, 
becoming a lifelong supporter of the Stuart cause and founder 
of a Jacobite club in Edinburgh. Ruskin asserts that the 
late novel Redmauntlet is evidence of the importance Scott's 
mind gave to this complex history.
With Sir Walter's grandfather there is a shift from 
cattle thieving to cattle dealing, and in this Ruskin sees 
the family move into essentially modem society. He insists, 
however, that a stubborn honesty, "inherited from his race," 
dominated Robert Scott as it had every member of the family.^1 
In the grandfather's rash investment of his profits, Ruskin 
finds the germ of Sir Walter's own financial difficulties. 
Direct relations between Sir Walter Scott and other members 
of the family are discussed both to establish moral and 
religious principles and to suggest biographical influences 
on characterization in Scott's novels. It is clear, however, 
that Ruskin frequently becomes interested in biography and
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history for its o\m sake and digresses Into anecdotes 
for no other apparent reason than because they are enter­
taining. He notes many parallels between history and the 
specific novels, but It would be to enforce an arbitrary 
formalism on his essays concerning Scott to imply that lit­
erary criticism Is their sole purpose.
Ruskin divides Scott's life Into three stages, youth, 
labor-tlme, and death-tlme.42 Greatest emphasis Is placed 
on discussion of his youth, which, Ruskin states, lasted 
twenty-five years. He argues that "the youth of all the 
greatest men" Is "long, and rich in peace, and altogether 
accumulative and crescent."^5 Scott's youth Is divided 
Into seven stages from his birth and unhealthy Infancy In 
Edinburgh to his apprenticeship to his father and earliest 
practice of law. Ruskin places emphasis on the early edu­
cation Scott received and particularly on "the three women 
who, as far as education could do It, formed the mind of 
S c o t t . T h e  importance of the order, quiet, and peace­
fulness of the home, directly attributable to women properly 
carrying out their role, Is central to the early awareness 
and literary consciousness of Scott. Ruskin compares his 
own childhood with that of the novelist and finds that each 
took place In positive circumstances. Except for the in­
fluence of one aunt, his mother, and an early romance,
Ruskin asserts, Sir Walter would have "assuredly been only
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hunting laird, and the best story-teller in the Lothians."^^ 
Ruskin'8 interest in Scott's ancestry and biography 
rests on the premise that a reader must understand the 
history in Scott's mind to grasp the subtlety of design in 
his fiction. There is, however, a second stated purpose 
which is not of a literary nature. He states in one essay 
of the Fors Clavigera series that In previous discussions 
of Scott he Is "examining the conditions of the life of this 
wise man, that they /Ruskin's readers/ may learn how to rule 
their own lives, or their children's, or their servants',"46 
Whatever his specific reasons for tracing Scott's life, 
there are frequent assertions of direct biographical sources 
In the novels. In Guy Mannerlng, A Legend of Montrose, and 
Old Mortality In particular, Ruskin finds aspects of Scott's 
life fictionalized.^7 He suggests that when Scott turned 
from poetry to prose fiction between 1810 and 1014, he 
ceased to be a singer and became a historian. For Ruskin 
the novels are history, different from traditional his­
torical writing only In their expression of deep feeling or 
sentiment. In the fourth volume of Modern Painters he 
argues that great artists— Dante, Scott, Turner, Tintoretto—  
create, not through "volmtary production of new Images, but 
an Involuntary remembrance, exactly at the right moment, 
of something they had actually seen."^8 The minds of these 
men are capable of retaining even the "slightest Intonations
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of syllables heard in the beginning of their lives." It 
is, for Ruskin, the involuntary association of this complex 
of accumulated data and impression which produces the body 
of an art which can thus be called historical.
Ruskin does not, by this principle, relegate the
subject matter of art to the literally verifiable. Writing
of the descriptive truth of Dante, Dickens, and Scott, he
illustrates the imaginative scope of "history" in its
literary expression:
From Dante's Paradise to Dickens' Prison every word 
of noble description is written by personal vision 
of the facts. Dante had seen Heaven as truly as Dickens 
the Marshalsea. Understand at once and forever, if you 
can, this eternal difference between good and bad work. 
Dante had seen Love, and Honour, and Learning, and 
Patience, and Shame in living human creatures, and the 
glory and happiness of the creatures in them. . . .
And Dickens had seen Lust, and Fraud, and Ignorance, 
and Covetousness, and Insolent Shame, and all the other 
gods whom England now serves, in their nakedness, and 
truly wrote of the conditions of their service.^9
Upon this concept of reality and its description in art, 
Ruskin concludes that Scott is the "greatest of imaginative 
artists in fiction, because he is the faithfullest of obser­
vers." At its highest level the novelist's imagination may 
move beyond association to a prophetic function. Passages 
in The Antiquary in which a town clerk successfully bargains 
to cut a water channel through Oldbuck's property in ex­
change for ancient stones from a chapel are compared with 
actual letters from Scott to the builder of his home,
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Abbotsford. Ruskln finds in the fictional scenes, written 
in I8l6, Scott's "prophetic instinct with which great men 
of every age mark and forecast its destinies."50 This 
novelist, Ruskin argues, anticipates the directions of 
change toward a society of "modern cockneyism" in which the 
tradition of an ancient shrine is traded for the efficiency 
of a public road.
In addition to the historical and prophetic roles of 
the novelist that concern Ruskin, he also discusses Scott's 
creation of character and the specific biographical sources 
of his characters. Ruskin finds aspects of directly auto­
biographical characterization in at least three of Scott's 
novels. In The Antiquary. Rob Roy, and Redgauntlet he 
notes three "definite and intentional portraits of himself 
. . . each giving a separate part of himself."51 The three 
figures, Jonathan Oldbuck of Monkbams, Frank Osbaldistone, 
and Alan Fairford respectively, are not discussed at length, 
but Ruskin establishes the point that Scott drew directly 
from his own experience in developing characters. Ruskin 
also makes unsupported allusions to characters in Scott's 
novels, evidently assuming that his own readers will make 
proper biographical identifications. In this manner he 
refers to Dandie Dinmont, Colonel Mannering, Counsellor 
Pleydell, and others as occasional guests at Abbotsford 
on a typical S u n d a y . 52 jn less specific although quite 
lengthy comment Ruskin argues that the characters in
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Scott's fiction are developed out of extensive knowledge 
of the people of his native society and of their religious 
assumptions.53 The dominant principle of Scott's char­
acterization, as well as the reason for the success of 
that characterization, is, as has been previously noted, 
that great fiction emerges from the mind which is capable 
of absorbing experience and impression. Scott, Ruskin 
insists, had such a mind.
The closest Ruskin comes to specific textual analysis 
is his study of Scott's use of dialect as compared with 
similar usage by other novelists. He distinguishes between 
dialect and "mere deteriorations" of language by localizing 
dialect to:
any district where there are persons of intelligence 
enough to use the language itself in all its fineness 
and force, but under the particular conditions of life, 
climate, and temper, which introduce words peculiar to 
the scenery, forms of word and idioms of sentence 
peculiar to the race, and pronunciations indicative of 
their character and disposition.54
In Humphry Clinker, Oliver Twist. and The Mill on the Floss
Ruskin finds only corrupt language "gathered by ignorance,
invented by vice, misused by insensibility, or minced and
mouthed by affectation,"55 but in Scott's fiction he finds
true dialect. Ruskin selects a brief passage from Rob Roy
to illustrate Scott’s usage. He notes some twenty-five
words or expressions in the selection, from the simple
"weel," "gude," and "mony" to "Curliewurlie," "opensteek
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hems," and "crouse." He attempts to discover the source 
of each term and to explain why the dialect form Is prefer­
able to any other.56 standard English spelling Is not 
modified for the sole purpose of Indicating pronunciation; 
the word "James," for example. Is spelled without modifi­
cation because, Ruskin concludes, only a Scot could pronounce 
It correctly, and variant spelling would be nothing more 
than affectation to please the reader. Such proper use of 
dialect In the novel Is, for Ruskin, one more evidence of 
Scott’s awareness of himself In time and place, of his 
ability to draw from the culture around him the essentials 
of an art which reflects truth and feeling.
One of Ruskin's criticisms of the nineteenth-century 
novelist Is that the biographical and historical functions 
necessary to great art have been Ignored or misunderstood.
He can find the Ideal of Scott's relationship with past 
and present In no other nineteenth-century writer. Only 
In Turner's landscape painting does he find any modem 
artist comparable to Scott. Marla Edgeworth, for example, 
falls In her role as historian because the comfort she 
derives from the age blinds her to any "balanced account 
of the pains of the poor" as well as the pleasures of the 
rich.57 Wien the writer looks to the modern world for 
subject material, he will find little which Is not diseased, 
and an art which Is solely pathologic, Ruskin asserts, loses
that balance which can be termed moral beauty. Ruskin's 
comment on the modern novel is primarily negative, pri­
marily an attack on the imbalance which results from ex­
cessive emphasis upon the city and its diseases, both moral 
and physical. To complete a survey of his criticism of 
prose fiction, it is necessary to consider the specifics 
of Ruskin's adverse response to those novels which emerged 
out of the society he knew.
The Victorian Kovel 
The last forty years of Ruskin's life were spent in 
intense concern for the moral and physical condition of the 
Victorian world. He found In urbanization and industrial­
ization forces destructive to every member of the society 
and, fearing the dehumanization of the culture, committed 
himself In speeches, essays, and personal letters to the 
task of reforming England. This Is not the place to discuss 
his many activities from road-building to operating a tea 
shop to structuring a neo-feudal society.58 The significant 
point is that for Ruskin environment has an overwhelming 
power to influence the individual. The man who daily sees 
nothing more than the monochrome of brick and of coal smoke 
will be a different person than that individual who dally 
studies a mutable nature, its rocks as well as its clouds.
An artist who lives in an unhealthy environment will not 
produce healthy art. Just as an audience conditioned by
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such an environment will have a distorted response to 
noble art.59 Ruskin's criticism of the nineteenth-century 
novel frequently reflects his social concern, and it provides 
explicit evidence to support his argument that the direc­
tions prose fiction takes in a culture are determined to 
a great extent by the culture Itself.
By no means does Ruskin imply that the novel was 
"pure" before the nineteenth century, destroyed solely by 
the utilitarian impulse of the age. Great art at any point 
in history is balanced in its presentation of truth and 
feeling: inferior art lacks this essential balance because 
it is untrue or because its element of sentiment is either 
excessive or inadequate. Ruskin judges the novels of Fielding 
and Smollett, for example, to be less than noble. In some­
what the same manner as he notes Voltaire's excessive wit 
and want of feeling, Ruskin asserts in an early letter:
I cannot . . . understand the feelings of men of 
magnificent wit and intellect, like Smollett and 
Fielding, when I see them gloating over and licking 
their chops over nastiness, like hungry dogs over 
ordure; founding one half of the laughable matter of 
their volumes in innuendoes of abomination.
In his own judgment the "taste" of these writers is distorted,
leading to an excessive concern for one aspect of human
experience. Ruskin asserts that the novels of these two
writers are not injurious to the mind, but he is certain that
they are tainted and in no way reflective of the moral
beauty of great art.
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The term "flmetic" is coined by Ruskin to describe 
the taint of Fielding, Smollett, Voltaire, and a host of 
nineteenth-century figures. The word, derived from the 
term "fime" or dung, means, for Ruskin, literature of the 
dunghill.Gl Such literature is at least partially truthful 
but in its lack of feeling reflects an unsympathetic author. 
One result of the fimetic taint is failure to produce fully 
developed characters in fiction. Ruskin argues that authors 
so tainted will "never invent character, properly so called; 
they only invent symbols of common h u m a n i t y . u p o n  this 
premise he Judges Fielding’s characters to be limited. 
Allworthy a type of simple English gentleman and Squire 
Western a type of rude English squire. A few writers are 
tainted but in their noblest work are capable of rising 
above the limitations the condition places upon them. Ruskin 
finds Chaucer and Shakespeare to be among this class of 
writers. The fimetic taint is also reflected in the subject 
material a writer chooses or in his presentation of subject 
in an analytic manner, without authorial sympathy.
Most of Ruskin’s discussion of the fimetic taint de­
rives from his concern for the subject matter of nineteenth- 
century fiction. He argues that only changes in the envir­
onment of the English child can produce changes in what the 
adult will create and in what he will desire to see created.
A child accustomed from birth to gravel, gas-lamp posts, 
old iron, and wood shavings as "a fixed condition of the
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universe, over the face of nature" will find no activity 
more pleasurable than the analysis of the physical cor­
ruption of that environment.^3 Ruskin suggests that the 
literature which emerges from the analysis of physical and 
moral disease, frequently the literary prod^uct of contem­
porary society, will not be imaginative. In Fiction, Fair 
and Foul he groups under five general divisions the many 
reasons for the unhealthy and unimaginative condition of 
contemporary fiction. The first of these divisions concerns 
the several results of the massing of people into large 
cities. Ruskin asserts that "hot fermentation and unwhole­
some secrecy" develop as members of the population lose 
privacy and individuality through overcrowding. The frus­
trations of each member of the society become infectious 
to every other member until the entire society is a mass of 
decay. There are an endless number of specific directions 
the distress of the individual may take, and Ruskin argues 
that a fiction created out of study of the particularities 
of urban decay becomes a scientific literature, closer to 
botany than to art In the traditional sense of the term.
In Balzac's Fere Goriot" Ruskin finds an Illus­
tration of his Ideas.^9 The story concerns a grocer who 
makes a large fortune, with which he Indulges the pleasures 
and pride of his two daughters. He marries them to men of 
title and even provides funds for his favorite to carry on
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an extramarital affair. This favorite is called to his death­
bed but,, having to decide between her father and a ball, 
chooses to attend the ball. Ruskin considers this sequence 
of events ample evidence of the Influence of the city on 
life as well as on the subject material of fiction. Because 
"a village grocer cannot make a large fortune, cannot marry 
his daughters to titled squires, and cannot die without 
having his children brought to him," Ruskin concludes that 
the story could only take place in a city and could only 
have been conceived by one conditioned to urban life.^5 
He argues, secondly, that more profound than the 
analytical curiosity formed by the variety of diseases 
created in urban society is the personal disgrace and grief 
which the constant pressure and friction of overcrowding 
inevitably bring. The individual becomes overwhelmed by:
The power of all surroundings over them for evil; the 
incapacity of their own minds to refuse the pollution, 
and of their own wills to oppose the weight, of the 
staggering mass that chokes and crushes them into 
perdition, brings every law of healthy existence into 
question with them, and every alleged method of help and 
hope into doubt. Indignation, without any calming 
faith in Justice, and self-contempt, without any curative 
self-reproach, dull the intelligence, and degrade the 
conscience. . .
The philosophy and the art which emerge out of such hope­
less: indignation will be partially satiric but partly con­
solatory, Ruskin asserts, concerning itself only with "the 
regenerative vigor of manure" but anxious to prove that 
"everybody's fault is somebody else's." A literature
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obsessed by this satiric-consolatory orientation will be 
shallow, ready to mix complacence with mild heresy but 
unwilling to practice self-chastisement.
Ruskin also finds the monotony of life in any great 
city a significant influence on the fiction which is pro­
duced in an urban society. He argues that man under proper 
conditions, primarily the conditions of external nature, 
is kept in a state of mental excitement because of constant 
contact with a variety of sense and physical experiences.
The changing of the seasons, the care and companionship 
of domestic animals, the processes of planting and reaping: 
these provide man with mental excitement adequate to sustain 
his body and imagination. The city, however, offers alter­
nations of heat and cold as the only signs of seasonal 
change, the routine of life divided between the office or 
shop and the street can only be broken by violence in the 
forms of death, injury, or thievery. Ruskin argues that 
such life will not create a desire in man for more varied 
experience, thus possibly causing him to turn to external 
nature. Instead, he will enjoy only forms of experience 
to which he has been conditioned and, as a result, desire 
no excitement which cannot be offered by the city.
Ruskin chooses Dickens' Bleak House to illustrate the 
effect of urban monotony on fiction. He counts ten deaths 
in the novel, each of which is in some way violent.
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"carefully wrought out or led up to, . . . o r  finished 
In their threatenings and sufferings with as much enjoyment 
as can be contrived in the anticipation, and as much path­
ology as can be concentrated in the description."^7 Ruskin's 
point is not that violence and death are in themselves 
unnatural, but that Bleak House is a domestic story, re­
flective of "the statistics of civilian mortality in the 
centre of London," not a tragic, adventurous, or military 
narrative. His charge is that the violence of most of the 
story is directed against inoffensive, respectable persons, 
and that Dickens presents the sequence without suggesting 
that there is anything unnatural in the apparent premise 
that it is the destiny of a large number of the population 
"to die -like rats in a drain, either by trap or poison."^8 
In contrast, Ruskin notes an approximately equal number of 
deaths in at least three of Scott's novels. Old Mortality. 
Waver ley, and Guy Mannerins. In these, hovrever, death is 
"either heroic, deserved, or quiet and natural."89 Even in 
his weaker fiction, Ruskin asserts, Scott, because of the 
essential health of his mind, was incapable of appealing 
to the excitement afforded by sickness and death. Ruskin 
clearly identifies Scott's fiction with the variety of 
external nature, Dickens' fiction with the monotony and 
resultant disease of the city.
Fiction, shaped by the environment of the writer and
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the demands of the public, ultimately becomes little more 
than a dally bulletin in "the prison calendar, the police 
news, and the hospital report." Men who have known only 
the misery of the city, who delight only in the study of 
its various maladies, will produce and seek a répertoriai 
literature. Ruskin illustrates the grotesque directions 
of fictional "reporting" with particular emphasis on French 
literature; Victor Hugo's The Hunchback of Notre-Dame, for 
example, is classed as "the effectual head of the whole 
cretinous school."70 The city- and disease-dominated imag­
ination will frequently center on the prison, the asylum, 
and the morgue, "amusing itself with destruction of the 
body, and busying itself with aberration of the mind."71 
Ruskin excepts from his attack that fiction which has definite 
historical and didactic purpose, that which reflects a writer 
concerned with warning his reader of the evil of urban 
civilization. To a degree the violent tales of Eugene Sue 
and Gaboriau are given qualified praise in these terms. That 
there is 1 ittle opportunity for the modern writer to observe 
and experience under healthy circumstances Ruskin readily 
admits; he does not, however, find this a justification for 
tolerating the pathologic labors of the contemporary novelist.
His final point is that in a village environment 
children, through close and constant contact with their 
elders, learn prudence, responsibility, dignity, and honor,
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values which are absent in an overcrowded society. Urban 
culture, Ruskin asserts, has established self-indulgence, 
a doctrine of unbridled pleasure, as the sole guide to 
individual choice, and, as a result, the events in the 
modern novel often turn upon the absence of traditional 
values of dignity and restraint. George Eliot’s The Mill 
on the Floss is singled out for one scene in which the 
heroine’s lack of prudence allows her to abandon sexual 
restraint. Ruskin views this story as typical of "the auto­
matic amours and involuntary proposals df recent romance 
^ h i c ^  acknowledge little further law of morality than 
the instinct of an insect, or the effervescence of a chem­
ical mixture."72 Fiction, Ruskin argues, does not in its 
most noble forma center upon individual accidents or on 
failures of insignificant characters, but upon the larger 
designs of human existence. In Scott’s relegation of love 
and marriage to a minor role in the total experience of life, 
cited earlier, Ruskin finds that balance which is absent in 
the mid-nineteenth-century novel. The problem of misplaced, 
distorted, or lost values illustrated in modern fiction is 
a result of that condition in urban culture itself, and 
Ruskin offers no hope that the directions of literary content 
can be changed until the environment of writer and audience 
is modified.
Sex and love in fiction are further discussed in
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an essay of the Fors ClavlRera series.73 Ruskin notes that 
in the novels of Scott, Marla Edgeworth, and Richardson 
there is a frankness in the confession of love and a fi­
delity regardless of the hopelessness of circumstances. He 
asserts that such frankness and fidelity are viewed by con­
temporary readers as absurd and Impossible. The only love 
modern youth have known, Ruskin suggests, is that which 
takes place "under the conditions in which it is also pos­
sible to the lower animals." As a result, these readers 
cannot respond to noble love. They can, however, respond 
to that fiction discussed above in which love and sex are 
enlarged to the degree of seeming to be man's sole reason 
for existing. They can respond to love and sex only as 
accidental, violent, and self-oriented.
Ruskin asserts that scientific thinking has a dominant 
influence on philosophic and religious thought, reflected 
in the literature of even the most profound thinkers. He 
laments that as a result of scientific thinking and result­
ant loss of religious faith:
. . . nearly all our powerful men in this age of the 
world are unbelievers; the beat of them in doubt and 
misery; the worst in reckless defiance; the plurality, 
in plodding hesitation, doing, as well as they can, 
what practical work lies ready to their h a n d s .
He argues that Dickens and Thackeray have set themselves
"against all religious form, pleading for simple truth and
benevolence." Balzac limits himself to statement of facts
divorced from feeling, and Beranger adopts a tone of
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"careless blasphemy." Even Sir Walter Scott, whose work 
is usually reserved for praise, is found to rely on "surface- 
painting" when confronting the most profound issues of 
religious faith. Ruskin traces the influence of scientific 
thought and resultant skepticism into politics, poetry, and 
painting; he concludes that lack of faith has an equally 
destructive influence on each.75 One example of the sci­
entific "blasphemy" which Ruskin finds in the nineteenth- 
century novel is in Thackeray's Vanity Fair. He quotes the 
concluding sentence of chapter thirty-two: "The darkness 
came down over the field and city, and Amelia was praying 
for George, who was lying on his face, dead, with a bullet 
through his heart."76 in these lines, with their "natural 
enthralment by the abominable," Ruskin identifies that 
deliberate emphasis upon the ignoble which is attractive to 
even the great minds of the age.
A few of Ruskin's opinions concerning specific Victorian 
novels derive from situations unrelated altogether to the 
individual works of literature themselves. Although he 
admits that he has read Disraeli's novels, Ruskin passes 
over them with no more comment than that the author is a 
clever coxcomb, "the last person fit to make Chancellor of 
the Exchequer,"77 His apparent reason for dismissing 
Disraeli's fiction is that he disagrees violently with the 
statesman's liberal political role. His dislike of Lord
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Beaconsfleld's politics is so great that any possible 
literary contribution is overshadowed.78 He is more willing 
to discuss Charles Kingsley’s fiction, but conflicts in non- 
literary areas limit any final respect for his work.79 
Ruskin alludes both favorably and unfavorably to Alton Locke 
in the third volume of Modern Painters. He finds praise­
worthy a passage of comment on landscape, but in his well- 
known discussion of the pathetic fallacy he draws his prime 
example of false description from the same n o v e l . Perhaps 
worth some consideration also is Ruskin's response to 
Kingsley’s satirical references to him in Glaucus; or, The 
Wonders of the Shore and in the poem "The Invitation to Tom 
Hughes." The latter with its lines, "Leave to Mournful 
Ruskin/ Popish Appennines,/ Dirty Stones of Venice/ And his 
Gas-lamps Seven-/ We've the stones of Snowdon/ And the lamps 
on Heaven," led Ruskin to comment in a personal letter, "I 
have half a mind to let him see a little bit of tusk-point 
one of these days."®l
Situations of this sort, in which personal or political 
conflicts make consideration of an author’s work difficult 
if not impossible, are not frequent. Ruskin's high personal 
regard for Charles Dickens and George Eliot, for example, 
does not restrain him from attacking Barnaby Ru(fee and The 
Mill on the Floss, the former as "an entirely profitless 
and monstrous story," the latter as a "railway novel" in
Ill
which the characters "are simply the sweepings out of a 
Pentonville omnibus."82 The majority of Ruskin's comment 
on the nineteenth-century novel is oriented to the works 
themselves and to the cultural problems which influence 
the directions of prose fiction. Finally convinced that 
human happiness is achieved through compassion, identified 
as sympathy or fellow-feeling, Ruskin asserts that the con­
dition depends upon the individual's ability to understand 
the nature of others, to put himself in another's place.
Only a person of Imagination can thus achieve compassion in 
its full sense. Because Ruskin finds his society unimag­
inative, self-oriented, and obsessed with its own diseases, 
he looks to fiction "to supply, as far as possible, the 
defect of this imagination in common minds. The ultimate 
frustration of this appeal to fiction is self-evident; he 
readily admits that the nature of individual works depends 
upon the "degree of imaginative power of the writers,"84 
and healthy imaginative power does not develop in an un­
healthy environment. Ruskin's Judgment of the nineteenth- 
century novel, then, is determined by his response to the 
culture out of which it emerges, a response as thoroughly 
negative as that of any other major Victorian.
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IWorka, XV, p. 351. The aphorism Is repeated sev­
eral times in his lectures and essays (VII, p. 453; XXXIII, 
p. 305; XXXIV, p. 310).
2Works. XXXIV, pp. 265-394.
3works. XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX.
4works. XVII, p. 105.
5Works, XXXIV, pp. 287-288. Ruskin had stated this 
principle In each of the first three volumes of Modem 
Painters. His classification of Scott's works In terms of 
quality Is discussed In section two of this chapter.
Gworks, XI, p. 180.
7Works. XXXIV, pp. 283-284.
^Works. XXXIV, pp. 285-286. Ruskin supports this
assertion by reference to subordination of the Henry-
Katherine courtship In Henry V and to the last-sentence 
resolution of a courtship, almost as an afterthought. In 
Scott's The Abbot.
^Ruskln's point Is drawn from a statement by Scott 
that "without courage there Is no truth, and without truth 
there Is no virtue," g^uoted In Lockhart's Life of Scott 
/Works. XXXIV, p. 22^.
lOWorks. XXXIV, p. 295; pp. 383-38?.
llWorks, XXXIV, p. 389. Ruskin associates Gllflllan, 
a figure In Waverley, with Falrservlce In these terms of 
evangelical narrowness.
IZwbrks. XXXIV, pp. 387-388.
^^ o r k s , XXXIV, pp. 382-383. Ruskin Illustrates the
five groups with the following characters In order from 
lowest to highest: (1) Trumbull (Redgauntlet), Trusty
Tomkyns (Woodstock), Burley (Old Mortality); (2) Falrservlce 
(Rob Roy), Blattergowl (The Antiquary), Kettledrummle 
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(The Fortunes of Nigel), David Deans (Heart of Midlothian), 
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l?Works, V, pp. 334-335.
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19vorks, XCXIV, p. 275. Ruskin cites Forster, Charles 
Dickens' biographer, who explained that he, not Dickens, 
thought of killing Nell.
ZOWorks. XXXIV, p. 277-278.
21works. XXXIV, p. 274.
22works. XXIX, p. 266.
23Works, XXIX, pp. 267, 456. Both references are in 
the essays of Fors Clavigera.
24works. XXIV, p. 277.
25works. XVIII, pp. 299-300.
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between reason and passion here; he simply argues that 
unquestioned faith in education is unjustified.
27works, XXXV, p. 308.
^^Works. XXVII, p. 167. '̂he reference is to Robinson 
Crusoe and The Pilgrim'a Progress.
29works, XXXVI, p. 153. The: references are probably 
to Johnson's Idler and Rambler essays. Goldsmith's The 
Vicar of Wakefield, and Richardson's Sir Charles Grandison. 
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30works. XXXI, p. 94.
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32works. XXVIII, p. 189.
33works. XXXVII, p. 10.
^% o r k s , XXVII, p. 562.
^Sworks. XXVII, p. 563.
^^Works. XXVIII, p. 496.
37works, XII, p. 117.
38^orks, XXVII, pp. 565-583. Ruskin cites Lockhart’s 
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ical and biographical information. The ancestry Ruskin 
traces centrally .concerns the following figures: (1)
Walter Scott (Auld Wat) of Harden, (2) Sir William Scott 
of Harden, (3) Walter Scott of Raeburn, (4) Walter Scott,
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39works. XXVII, p. 577.
^% o r k s . XXVII, pp. 573-574. Caught marauding on 
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or being killed; "not it is said without hesitation," he 
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A % o r k s , XXVII, p. 578. Italics are Ruskin's.
^^Ruskin also divides Scott's novels into three 
periods, developing in the process a theory that the quality 
of his fiction corresponds directly with his physical health. 
The theory is not discussed in this study because its 
application to Scott's work is too fraught with error.
Ruskin places Rob Roy and Heart of Midlothian among Scott's 
half-dozen best novels, thus produced in his most healthy 
years; in fact, they were both written in periods of acute 
illness and pain /%rks, XXXIV, pp. 287-292/.
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51works, XXVII, p. 298. Ruskin enlarges somewhat 
upon the autobiographical aspects of Oldbuck and Fairford 
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in Guy Mannering. Ruskin probably assumes his readers are 
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of the moral orientation of figures in Scott's novels and 
need not be repeated here.
S^works. XXXIV, p. 293.
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trated in his comment that he cares no more for either 
"than for two old bag-pipes with the drones going by steam."
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from his alleged failure to stand by Carlyle, Ruskin, and 
others in their defense of Governor Eyre, an Englishman 
charged with unnecessary violence in putting down a riot 
in Jamaica. Kingsley's sympathies were apparently with Eyre, 
but Carlyle and Ruskin felt that he was "hanging back afraid" 
/Works. XVI11, pp. xliv-xlvi; XXXIV, p. 60^.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Ruskin'B critical method in discussing prose fiction 
is thoroughly extrinsic.1 His study of literature concerns 
itself with external causes and effects; seldom, if ever, 
is it concerned with explication de texte or any other of 
the analytical processes of an intrinsic critical method.
The individual literary work exists, for Ruskin, in a histor­
ical context and can best be understood by a reader aware of 
that context. He finds the experiences and Impressions which 
constitute the author's imagination to be an integral and 
observable part of the finished artistic work. A reader's 
experience with a novel is inevitably a sharing of the life 
of the creator. The literary critic, then, has a double 
function; he considers history, both personal and social, 
in order to elucidate a given work, and he studies the in­
dividual writing or body of writings in order to better under­
stand the personality of the writer and the nature of his 
culture. Bertram Morris argues well that Ruskin's "criticism 
was one which grounded art in a nobility that could come 
only from a social matrix. He taught that a great society 
will have great men, and its art too will be great; for art 
is an exponent of the worth of society."2 Ruskin insists 
that the object of art is always an artifact which reflects
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the whole experience of man, and he rejects suggestion that 
the existence of an individual work is Justified by any 
quality, structural or aesthetic, which is not related to 
the physical and moral context of human life. The critical 
practice of Ruskin does not admit the possibility that study 
of literature solely for its intrinsic values can be more 
than ignoble and irrelevant escapism.
Much of the aesthetic theory of Modern Painters. The 
Seven Lamps of Architecture, and The Stones of Venice antic­
ipates the specific assumptions of his applied criticism 
of prose fiction. Ruskin asserts from the first volume of 
Modern Painters that moral unity and harmony are essential 
to both artist and viewer. Both must see clearly the world 
around them in order to create or to assess properly the 
creation of others. An artist who paints what he is con­
ditioned to think he should see rather than what he actually 
sees will produce an inferior art; the viewer who responds 
to art through false conditioning will arrive at faulty 
Judgments.5 Victorian fiction, Ruskin concludes, is the 
product of men whose vision has been distorted by the un­
healthy environment of an urban, industrialized society. 
Readers who demand a répertoriai, violent, diseased fiction 
are responding to the same conditioning. Great art expresses 
"the greatest number of greatest ideas," but, Ruskin sug­
gests, the novelist of the mid-nineteenth century is no
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longer capable of producing those ideas, and his audience 
can no longer receive them. Review of the existing literary 
products of the age and their popularity with the general 
public illustrates this condition.
The educative function Ruskin assumed in Modern Painters
becomes a reforming function by the 1870's and iBBO's when
most of his literary criticism was produced. John D.
Rosenberg argues convincingly that art and social reform
are, in Ruskin's total aesthetic, inseparably related:
The artist, himself a product of society, produces 
an art whose style is an accurate index to the moral 
qualities of that society. A decadent society pro­
duces a decadent art; a Joyless or smog-ridden society 
produces dismal art, or none at all. A thing of beauty 
may be a Joy forever, but only for those who have the 
leisure to look at it with unwearied and educated eyes.
The England of Manchester or Birmingham could not, Ruskin 
believed, produce artists or a public capable of appre­
ciating art. His impulse to social reform thus stemmed 
from his belief that beauty was a sacrament in which all 
were entitled to partake but from which most were in 
fact excluded: industry without art is brutality, art
without industry is guilt.4
An aesthetic which describes noble art must also describe
the conditions of noble life. Thus, without abandoning his
early art theory, Ruskin turns to criticism of the problems
created by an "unaesthetic" culture, problems reflected both
in the object of art and in life itself.5 In The Seven
Lamps of Architecture and The Stones of Venice Ruskin argues
that an integral relationship exists between the quality of
an architectural work and the moral and physical conditions
of the workman. There is no fundamental shift in thought
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in his argument, long after the publication of those works, 
that the quality of prose fiction is dependent upon the 
same conditions in the author.
The emphasis Ruskin places on truth, beauty, and 
feeling in his aesthetics and in his applied criticism has 
been noted several times in this study and need not be fur­
ther discussed in detail. In his criticism of the novel 
Ruskin does not explicitly cite his early comments on the 
Theoretic faculty of the imagination, that faculty which 
allows moral response to beauty, nor does he discuss those 
divine attributes— infinity, unity, repose, symmetry, purity, 
and moderation— which can produce Theoria. The fact that he 
does not return to discussion of the faculties of the imag­
ination should not suggest that he abandoned the aesthetic 
principles involved; it is adequate to note that from his 
explicit comments on the Victorian novel he could not have 
returned to these principles except in the most abstract 
terms. In the fiction of the mid-nineteenth century the 
qualities which can most nobly affect the imagination of a 
properly conditioned reader are absent, as that reader him­
self is absent. The fiction of Sir Walter Scott and, it 
is implied, Ruskin's own response to it provide the only 
literary examples in the nineteenth century of the creation 
and response to the highest levels of truth and beauty.
In his classification of artists as purists, naturalists,
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and sensualists in the second volume of The Stones of Venice, 
amplified in Modern Painters III, Ruskin establishes the 
"naturalist ideal" as that in which the artist comprehends 
and expresses the .nity and indivisibility of man in nature, 
the unity and indivisibility of the universe itself.^ He 
explicitly rejects both sensualists and purists for their 
oversimplification of the total experience of man. There 
are, however, distinct problems in tracing the operation 
of this principle in his applied criticism. In painting 
Ruskin is rarely able to appreciate nudity; he never finds 
representation of contemporary civilization praiseworthy.
His literary criticism accepts the urban settings of Dickens, 
but the final product is consistently Judged to be flawed, 
never noble. Ruskin justifies his conclusions by assessing 
overt expression of sex and of urban life to be sensually 
oriented. Thus he finds most contemporary art distorted by 
the individual artist's inability to sense and record the 
full human experience, the experience which moves beyond a 
complex of facts. The justification has not gone unchal­
lenged,? although a reader cognizant of Ruskin's funda­
mentalist origins and his early contact with external nature 
can understand these possibly inconsistent critical judgments.
Ruskin's aesthetic theory and critical practice are 
seldom considered in relation to that of other major 
nineteenth-century figures. Perhaps because of the body
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and scope of his work, the large majority of Ruskin studies 
make no attempt to place his writing within the intellectual 
context of his age. Infrequently a writer will suggest a 
brief comparison, such as Charles Dougherty's assertion 
that, in his fundamental assumption of the unity and indi­
visibility of man, Ruskin "is at one with Matthew Arnold and 
with Newman,"® but these allusions are seldom developed. No 
discussion of the relationship of his literary criticism 
to that of other writers has yet appeared. A thorough 
investigation of the topic is, of course, beyond the scope 
of this study, but even a brief review of Victorian theory 
and opinion suggests that Ruskin's literary criticism, while 
it may be distinctly "Ruskinian" in tone and phrasing, is 
neither innovative nor Iconoclastic. More than three decades 
before his birth the annual publication of novels took the 
lead over theological works and thereafter continued to 
increase its dominance over all other book publishing.^ 
Opposition to the literary genre was, by the 1820's and 
1830's, still existent, but it had no observable influence 
on either the publication or sales of novels. Thus, Ruskin's 
early contact with the form was consistent with the patterns 
of English society in general, and his comments are directed 
to a public to whom the novel was the principal literary 
fare.
In his series of lectures collected in 1859 as British
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Novelists and Their Styles, David Masson does not hesitate 
to parallel forms of the novel with poetical forms, finding 
the novel at Its highest a "prose Epic."10 He recognizes 
that the "thousand and one stories of society In Mayfair" 
make a poor comparison with the wanderings of Ulysses, hut 
argues that the potential of prose fiction Is as great as 
that of narrative poetry, limited only by the convention of 
stating the most exalted subject material In verse. Masson's 
lectures trace the history of the novel from beginnings 
to the mid-nineteenth century and are, as a result, much more 
systematic than any of Ruskin's literary criticism. He Is 
In agreement with Ruskin, however. In arguing that "the 
deepest literary criticism Is that which connects a man's 
writings most profoundly and Intimately with his personality, 
conceived comprehensively and with central accuracy. . .
In his discussions of various outstanding fictional works 
he consistently surveys aspects of the life of each author 
which seem to be related to the Individual work. Masson 
places more emphasis on the artist as thinker than does 
Ruskin, but he admits that the act of creation may be Intu­
itive, that the author may not be "thoroughly conscious of 
the meaning he was Infusing Into It,"12 a premise which is 
central to Ruskin's assessment of the process by which the 
most noble art Is produced.
It Is In his lengthy discussion of Scott that Masson's
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critical Judgments may most easily be compared with those 
of Ruskin.13 The critic sees Scott's love for the past and 
his intense "Scottism" as the primary qualities of his 
genius, but he is unwilling to credit the novelist with a 
historical function. Unlike Ruskin, Masson sees Scott's 
passion for history as poetical rather than strictly and 
philosophically historical. Masson places emphasis on 
Scott's "veneration for the past" as a sympathetic response 
to a few moments, primarily gothic, in history, moments 
often more fictional than factual. Ruskin, as was noted 
earlier, also Judges feeling or sympathy to be a significant 
aspect of Scott's fiction, but he insists that truth, in 
this case personal experience and historical fact, controls 
the direction of his greatest novels. Masson and Ruskin 
agree that Scott's work reflects an intense familiarity with 
the geography of Scotland as will as an intimate knowledge 
of Scottish institutions and of the dialect, thought, and 
humors of all ranks of his c o u n t r y m e n . M a s s o n  acknowl­
edges Ruskin as having established in Modern Painters III 
the relationship of Scott to external nature, the novelist's 
sense of landscape which the critic asserts has Influenced 
the directions of subsequent fiction.^5
The greatest differences in Ruskin's and Masson's 
responses to prose fiction appear in their attitudes toward 
fiction of the mid-nineteenth century. Masson passes no
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moral Judgment upon urban society other than implied 
acceptance of It as an Integral part of the total culture. 
He suggests that Dickens and Thackeray can be considered 
the founders of a branch of the novel of manners, "the 
British Metropolitan Novel," and he assesses their work to 
be wholly positive and c o n t r i b u t i v e . Both novelists are 
capable of objectively observing and commenting on society 
and Its Institutions; neither Is seen as trapped by envir­
onmental conditioning, perhaps because Masson Is not con­
vinced that England Is In the process of physical and moral 
decay. He acknowledges that the proper role of the contem­
porary novel may be In the realm of social reality, a term 
under which he lists Dickens and Thackeray, but argues that 
at Its most noble prose fiction may, through presentation 
of "characters of heroic Imaginary mould, . . . remove us 
from cities and the crowded haunts of men."^7 Masson's 
appreciation of Scott, like Ruskin's, recognizes that there 
can be a felicity In fiction which emerges out of contact 
with external nature, a felicity not found In the novel of 
the city.
There are numerous theoretical discussions of the 
novel. Its place In literary history, and Its functional 
relation to the reader. Of these, two may be briefly con­
sidered In terms of Ruskin's coiments on fiction. In 1862 
Thomas Hill Green presented the essay "The Value and Influ-
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ence of Works of Fiction" at Oxford.18 In the same manner 
as David Masson he notes the possibility of comparing the 
novel with narrative poetry, potentially with the epic.
Green, however, argues that in reality the novel as It 
exists In England centers upon external qualities of char­
acters rather than, as In great poetry, emerging out of the 
Interior values and essential conflicts of figures. Thus, 
he suggests, it is unlikely that prose fiction has any deeply 
meaningful influence on readers. Green recognizes, as does 
Ruskin, that the division of labor and specialization pro­
duced by industrialization lead to a sense of incompleteness 
in the individual person. In the newspaper and the novel 
Green finds the only means by which modern man can attain, 
in the imagination at least, those experiences and affections 
which urban life denies. This is not necessarily a positive 
function however, for Green, like Ruskin, concludes that the 
novel will do little more than mirror the reader's own 
external environment, leaving him "poring over a detail of 
the causes and symptoms of the disease which he hugs. . . ."19 
The combination of Ruskin's confidence that fiction 
has great potential to "do good" and his awareness that the 
potential has been seldom realized finds a counterpart in 
Green's essay. He argues that despite the self-orientation 
and resultant sentimentality typical of an art which mirrors 
the diseases of the reader, the novel can reveal social
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injustices and possibly have a corrective influence on the 
culture. The works of Scott, Thackeray, Dickens, and 
others reveal that the "novelist catches the cry of suffering" 
before it is publicly . h e a r d . ^ 0  ffo evidence is given, 
however, to suggeat that this potential has had a significant 
influence on society or on individual responses to the 
injustices of society. Green's central argument is that 
the novel may to a degree cultivate the weakest intellects, 
but it will also have a conforming tendency on the higher 
intellectual orders, thus leveling the entire society to 
general acceptance of uninspired reporting as the purpose 
of fiction. His view of Victorian culture as decayed and 
thoroughly ignoble, reflected clearly in the prose fiction 
of the age, is close to that of Ruskin. Green's style is
more conservative, less vivid, than that of his elder, but
his ideas suggest that Ruskin's opinions were by no means 
held in isolation.
A decade earlier, Arthur Hugh Clough, writing a
brief review of a minor poet's work for The North American
Review, attempts to explain why the modern novel is preferred 
by the public to poetry, particularly to poetry based on 
classical models.21 He recognizes that "people much prefer 
Vanity Fair and Bleak House" to poetical works that move 
beyond the pale of everyday activity, that "often dirty, or 
at least dingy, work which it is the lot of so many of us
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to have to do, and which some one or other, after all, 
must do."22 dough suggests that the modern reader may be 
of a more practical, prosaic mind than his predecessors and, 
as a result, find images of the factory and of "urban and 
suburban dustiness" most familiar and attractive. Unlike 
the noble poet who asks man to consider a higher unity, that 
"purer existence" to which man, however abased, may relate 
himself, the modern novelist builds his reader "a real 
house to be lived in; and this common builder, with no notion 
of the orders, is more to our purpose than the student of 
ancient art who proposes to lodge us under an Ionic portico."23 
Clough laments the pedestrian nature of that literature 
which the reading public most eagerly accepts. He finds, 
as does Ruskin, the source of this appeal in the shifting 
environment of the English reader, and his implied conclusion 
is that men seek representations in art of the life with 
which they are familiar. Thus fiction becomes a record of 
the urbanized, industrialized society with no ends more 
noble than reporting the "general wants, ordinary feelings" 
of the reader.
Huskin'3 specific literary opinions, particularly 
his Judgment of Scott as the greatest of English novelists, 
are generally close to those of other Victorians. James T. 
Hillhouse, in his survey of Scott's literary reputation 
from I8l4 to 1935, suggests that the novelist became a
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standard by which Victorians measured their own best authors,
including Dickens, Thackeray, and E l i o t . T h e  emphasis
upon biographical and historical material related to Scott,
central to Ruskin's assessment of the novelist, was typical
of the Victorian reader in general. Hillhouse sees "personal
affection" for Scott a relevant point in the popularity of
his fiction through the nineteenth century:
It is clear enough that Scott's character and person­
ality were of tremendous service in keeping alive the 
fame of his novels and poems. Through most of the 
Victorian period, the acclaim of Scott as a man was 
as great as it had been in his own lifetime. . . .
The Victorians had no writer of their own . . . for 
whom they felt the personal affection and tenderness 
and reverence that they lavished on this idol of the 
last age.25
Even Thomas Carlyle, who judges Scott's novels as having 
little more purpose than to amuse "indolent languid men," 
is swayed by the impressive facts of Scott's life to give 
the writer credit for his overwhelming success.26 Tennyson 
is closer to Ruskin in acknowledging the greatness both of 
Scott's life and of his literary production in his comment, 
"Scott is the most chivalrous literary figure of this century, 
and the author with the widest range since Shakespeare.
The repetitious listing of literary opinions neither 
establishes nor challenges the validity of Ruskin's literary 
criticism, but it does suggest that his Victorian readers 
found little that was unfamiliar in the pages of Fors 
Clavlgera and Fiction, Fair and Foul. They may, however,
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have found several conspicuous omissions. Jane Austen, 
Charlotte Bronte, and George Meredith were writing In 
approximately the same years as Scott, Dickens, and Eliot 
respectively; Ruskin refers to the latter figures many times 
yet seems never to have read the former. Likewise, William 
Godwin's fiction, especially Caleb Williams, was respected 
and In Its concentration on social justice should have 
gained Huskin's attention, but there Is no reference to 
Godwin, either to his fiction or to Political Justice. In 
his works.28 These Inconsistencies In Ruskin's reading do 
not have their source In chronology and In the decay of 
sensibility as R. H. Wllenskl argues (see footnote 7); 
rather, they relate directly to the highly Individual manner 
In which he pursued every personal Interest throughout his 
career. Those discoveries he did make— Turner, Veronese, 
Scott, the Pre-Raphaelites, the Ducal Palace— are given 
his full time, energy, and devotion, but he Is unsystematic 
In his application to any single discipline.29
Ruskin's penchant for using literary criticism as 
a vehicle for social and economic statement and his frequent 
assertion of authorial Intention In specific works have led 
some readers to criticize his methods. Matthew Arnold, who 
charges Ruskin with sentimentality and provinciality In his 
comment on Homer and Shakespeare, cited his peer as evidence 
of the principle that
132
the critic must keep out of the region of immediate 
practice in the political, social, humanitarian sphere, 
if he wants to make a beginning for that more free 
speculative treatment of things, which may perhaps one 
day make its benefits felt even in this sphere, but in 
a natural and thence irresistable manner.30
Ruskin, in Arnold's judgment, suffers from a loss of critical
objectivity; he uses literary criticism to reinforce his
personal affections and to propagate his public opinions
rather than accepting criticism as an independent, self-
justifying discipline. In a less serious tone Henry James
noted in the l870's that Ruskin is often guilty of "the
attribution of various incongruous and arbitrary intentions
to the artist. . . ."31 Comparing Ruskin with a French art
critic, James comes to essentially the same conclusion as
does Arnold: Ruskin's "too passionate" urge to establish
"his rigid conception of the right" leads him to unjustified
excesses in his criticism. In another instance Henry James
argues that Huskin's emphasis upon the duty of the viewer
distorts the meaning of art. Essentially, James's charge
is against excessive seriousness and false perspective:
One may read a great many pages of Mr. Ruskin without 
getting a hint of this delightful truth; a hint of 
the not unimportant fact that art, after all, is made 
for us, and not we for art. . . . And as for Mr.
Ruskin'8 world of art being a place where we may take 
life easily, woe to the luckless mortal who enters it 
with any such disposition. Instead of a garden of 
delight, he finds a sort of assize court, in perpetualsession.32
Matthew Arnold and Henry James cannot accept Ruskin's crit­
icism because their own assumptions concerning the function
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of the critic differ from his on too fundamental a level.
Both demand that the critic assess his subject in an objec­
tive manner; Ruskin insists that the role of the critic is 
personal, moral, and social.33
As was noted in the first chapter of this study.
Huskin's literary criticism has been generally ignored 
through the first half of the twentieth century. The pop­
ularity of scientific, analytical methods in the criticism 
of the present age has not made attractive the voluminous 
work of a man who, as E. T. Cook comments, "was not so much 
a critic, as a crusader."34 Those highly personal, seemingly 
arbitrary assertions to which Arnold and James objected in 
the nineteenth century have become no more acceptable in 
the twentieth. Similarly, the biographical, historical, 
and moral contexts by which Ruskin frequently assesses lit­
erature are likely to be questioned or discounted altogether 
by a critical structure centered upon the work itself. When 
his Judgments are acceptable, the tone which Ruskin assumes 
in asserting himself may alienate the reader. Walter 
Houghton concludes that the dogmatic, assertive quality of 
Ruskin's work emerges not so much from personal arrogance 
as from an intellectual context within which he assumed his 
statements were, in fact, fixed laws of "truth and right," 
an assumption common to the greatest minds of the period.35 
Thus a reader who dismisses Ruskin's critical Judgments
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because of their tone may be misreading the context which 
produces that q.uality.
There is much of what C. S. Lewis calls the medieval 
"image" In Ruskin'8 critical method.V/hile Ruskin can 
by no means be totally identified with this aspect of 
medievalism, he does refuse to condense his ideas, to elim­
inate all but the essential framework of his thought; he 
consistently enlarges, digresses, and implicitly demands 
that his reader* acknowledge that a lecture titled 
"Crystallography" can properly treat Cistercian architecture. 
"The whole of Ruskin's opus," as John Rosenberg suggests, "is 
an uninterrupted dedication to the Oneness of the many."37 
Morton Berman explains the elaboration and seeming digres­
sion of Ruskin*S work as clearly as anyone who has treated 
the topic: "The point is . . . that Ruskin must use all of 
his details because he is committed to the view that nothing 
is irrelevant, and that the whole can only be grasped if all 
of the parts are given their due."38 The qualities of elab­
oration in Ruskin's prose, then, are a functional part of 
his total approach to any given topic. The post-Victorian 
reader, "compelled to extract the greatest intellectual and 
spiritual nourishment . . . /he/ can, within the smallest 
compass," may find this method distracting, perhaps even 
unreadable.39
To sympathetically consider the literary criticism
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of John Ruskin Is to become conscious that "No wreck is so 
frequent, no waste so wild, as the wreck and waste of the 
minds of men devoted to the arts."40 Ruskin's concept of 
the "unity and indivisibility" of man, illustrated in aes­
thetic principle and critical practice, may appear- outmoded, 
subjective, and capricious to the twentieth-century student.
It is inconceivable that he could have achieved the contem­
porary vision that man makes experience meaningful by 
creating personal identity, personal values, out of nothing­
ness, Perhaps only to the reader willing to sympathetically 
consider Ruskin's aesthetic and critical assumptions does 
the very real power of his mind reveal Itself. Two such 
diverse readers as Virginia Woolf and Graham Hough have, in 
sympathetic reading, found that "In the passages on litera­
ture that are scattered through his writings we are constantly 
compelled, in spite of frequent disagreement, to acknowledge 
the energy and acuteness of his Judgments."^1 Future 
scholarship may reveal unrecognized approaches and insights 
in his work, as Harold Bloom's recent essay has,^^ but if 
it does not, knowledge of Ruskin's aesthetics and literary 
criticism still remains essential to understanding one 
aspect of the Victorian age.
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FOOTNOTES
iRene Welleck and Austin Warren in their study,
Theory of Literature (New York, 1956), provide a discus­
sion of extrinsic method in literary criticism (pp. 61- 
124).
—Bertram Morris, "Ruskin on the Pathetic Fallacy, 
or on How a Moral Theory of Art May Fail," Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism. XIV (December 1955), ^ 6 .
^For all of his realization of the power of environ­
ment, Ruskin never moves to Wilde's "Nature imitates art."
The moral context within which all experience is assessed 
keeps Ruskin from ultimately reaching a sense of what Morse 
Peckam calls "the dynamic relation between orientation 
and perception in both art and science" /Beyond the Tragic 
Vision (New York, 1962), p. 2^.
^John D. Rosenberg, The Darkening Glass A Portrait 
of Ruskin's Genius (New York, 1961), p. 43.
5In his essay "Ruskin and George Eliot's 'Realism'" 
/Criticism. VIII (Summer 1965), 20_^, Darrel Mansell argues 
that "For Ruskin, great art in some way reflects the mind of 
the artist; and Inferior art impersonally reflects only the 
subject." Mansell sees George Eliot's assumption that "Art 
is always the mirror of a mind," as directly formed by 
Ruskin'8 aesthetics.
^Graham Hough extends the specific artistic limits 
of this point in his suggestion that it is Ruskin's "special 
distinction" to have shown how aesthetic experience "can 
lead directly to that unified apprehension of nature, and 
of ourselves as a part of nature, which can fairly constantly 
be recognized, under various mythological disguises, not 
only as that which gives value to aesthetic experience, 
but also as one of the major consolations of philosophy" 
/^Ruskin and Roger Fry: Two Aesthetic Theories," Cambridge
Journal, I (October 194?), 2%%.
7R. H. Wilenski in his psychology-oriented study of 
Ruskin's life and work argues that Ruskin's later criticism 
is irrelevant because "he cared so little about art":
"After forty he took no interest at all in contemporary 
production; and even before that age there were times when 
he escaped from the hard task of understanding the present 
to the easy pastime of pretending to understand the past. 
After forty he became one of the thousands of people who
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imagine that they can understand the original art created 
by dead cultures though they cannot understand the original 
art of the living culture around them. In his early years 
he knew that no one can understand any aspect of human 
activity unless he can understand it In men who are alive" 
/John Ruskin An Introduction to Further Study of His Life 
anA Work (New York, 1933), p.’~5437^ Without naming Wilenski, 
Ros aiberg challenges the conclusions of "a brilliant critic 
of Ruskin" by noting that any lessened passion for art 
after 1859 resulted from "that larger collapse of nature 
whose perfection he could no longer find mirrored In art." 
This critic directly contradicts Wilenski, asserting that 
Ruskin in the 1870's was still discovering art and artists 
never before appreciated (pp. 43-45).
Scharles T. Dougherty, "Ruskin's Moral Argument," 
Victorian Newsletter. No. 9 (Spring 1956), 5.
9John Tinnon Taylor, Early Opposition to the English 
Novel (New York, 1943), p. 6.
lODavid Masson, British Novelists and Their Styles 
(London, 1859), pp. 2-5.
l^Masson, p. 149.
l^Masson, pp. 23-24.
13Masson gives inordinate attention to Scott, about 
one-fourth of his entire survey of English prose fiction.
In a prefatory note he acknowledges some Imbalance by 






^®Thomas Hill Green, "The Value and Influence of 
Works of Fiction," Works of Thomas Hill Green. Vol. Ill, 




^^Arthur Hugh Clough, "Recent English Poetry,"
The North American Review LXXVII (July 1853), 1-30. The 
specific comment“on the Victorian novel appears in a brief 
review of Alexander Smith's volume Poems.
22ciough, pp. 2-3.
Z^Glough, pp. 3-4.
24james T . Hillhouse, The Waverley Novels and Their 
Critics (Minneapolis, Minn.. 1936), pp. I9Ô-193, I97,
25Hillhouse, pp. 174-175. This scholar does not find 
a body of negative criticism of Scott's work developing 
until the 1890's.(p. 168).
2&Thomas Carlyle, "Sir Walter Scott," Critical and 
Miscellaneous Essays. Vol. IV (London, 1899), pp. 22-Ô7. 
Carlyle dismisses Scott's novels with vigor; ironically, 
the qualities he cannot find in the novelist are the same 
qualities which Ruskin argues are responsible for Scott's 
greatness: " . . .  there is little to be sought or found in
the Waverley Novels. Not profitable for doctrine, for 
reproof, for edification, for building up or elevating, in 
any shapeI the sick heart will find no healing here, the 
darkly-struggling heart no guidance: the Heroic that is
in all men no divine awakening voice. We say, therefore, 
that they do not found themselves on deep interests, but 
on comparatively trivial ones; not on the perennial, perhaps 
not even on the lasting" (p. 76).
2?Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson. A Memoir 
(London, 1897), p. 372. Hallam Tennyson is here quoting 
his father.
2®Masson, for example, cites Godwin as the only 
novelist writing between 1789 and I8l4 who is superior to 
Mrs. Radcliffe, Maria Edgeworth, and Jane Austen (p. 179).
^%hat Ruskin continued to read new works of fiction 
throughout his life is clearly established by his letters.
As late as 1688 in a letter to Miss Kate Greenaway, Ruskin 
writes that he is working his way through a circulating 
library and believes that he could produce "a recipe for 
the writing of novels without a novelity in them" (Works„ 
XXXVII, p. 601).
^^Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the 
Present Time," Lectures and Essays in Criticism, ed. R. H. 
Super (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 275.
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appears In the essay "On Translating Homer" (On the Classical 
Tradition). pp. 102, 149; the comment on Shakespeare is 
from "The Literary Influence of the Academies" (Lectures 
and Essays In Criticism), pp. 251-252.
^^Henry James, "Les Maîtres D'Autrefois," The Painter's 
Eye and Essays on the Pictorial Arts, ed. John L. Sweeney 
(London, 1956), p. 117.
32Henry James, "Recent Florence," Atlantic Monthly.
XLI (May 1878), 591.
^^Differences between Arnold and Ruskin should not 
be overemphasized; as Walter Houghton notes, there are close 
parallels In their rejections of Jest In literature on the 
common ground of "high seriousness" /The Victorian Frame of 
Mind (New Haven, 1957), p. 35^. In a lighter vein Arnold 
recalled his response to his sister's charge that he was 
becoming "as dogmatic as Ruskin": "I told her the difference
was that Ruskin was 'dogmatic and wrong'" (Lectures and 
Essays In Criticism, p. 402).
34e . T. Cook, The Life of John Ruskin. Vol. II (London, 
1911), p. 289.
55Houghton, pp. 143-145, 148-149. Houghton acknowledges, 
however, that "To turn to Ruskin's letters from his published 
works, with their explicit claims and Implicit assumptions 
of infallibility, is to hear a succession of cries from a 
bewildered and sometimes even a humble man" (p. 156).
36o. S. Lewis, The Discarded Image (Cambridge, 1964), 
pp. 1-21, 214-215. Lewis argues that the world wlew of the 
medieval writer led him to approach all accumulated knowledge 
and opinion as relevant to the total experience of man, 
that his works reflect a refusal, on established principle, 
to discriminate in the structuring of a literary work.
This principle, Lewis suggests, explains the multitude of 
"digressions" In medieval poetry.
^TRosenberg, p. 42. It Is Rosenberg who relates the 
Instance of Ruskin's discussing architecture In the lecture 
on crystallography (p. 41).
38îîorton Berman, "Studies In John Ruskl.n's Literary 
Criticism" (unpublished doctoral dissertation). Harvard 
(1957), 163.
39Derrlck Leon, Ruskin The Great Victorian (London,
TQ4Q)= n. 170.
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40feter Quennell, Jotm Ruskin ; The Portrait of a 
Prophet (New York, 1949), foreword.. The quotation is from 
a letter to Mrs, Hugh Miller written in I857.
^^Graham Hough, The Last Romantics (London, 1947), 
p. 3. Virginia Woolf argues that despite the early twentieth 
century's rejection of Ruskin's aesthetics and economics, 
a reader has to "reckon with a force which is not to be 
supressed by a whole pyramid of faults" /^Ruskin," The 
Captain's Death Bed and Other Essays (New York, 195077 
p. 51/.
^^Harold Bloom (see Chapter I, footnote 27) considers 
Ruskin the first archetypal critic.
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